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Abstract
Over the last century, vehicles have become the means of transport par excel-
lence. The widespread vehicle adoption by our societies has been a revolu-
tion in terms of employment patterns, social interactions, convenience and
economy. They undoubtedly bring many beneﬁts, but they also entail some
drawbacks such as an increase of trafﬁc congestion, accidents, air and noise
pollution, or de-ruralization.
Recently, the aggravation of these problems in urban areas, the emer-
gence of the Information and Communication Technologies, and a greater
awareness in society of these problems have led to solutions such as the de-
ployment of Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) systems. The main purpose of
these systems is to restrict the access of vehicles to certain city areas, named
Low Emission Zones (LEZ), for which a toll is assessed according to trafﬁc
conditions and vehicle emissions.
Since their adoption, these solutions have proven to be quite promis-
ing. However, current proposals are still far from being ideal. While re-
ducing congestion to some extent, they exhibit several shortcomings, above
all, related to payment fairness and privacy issues. More speciﬁcally, cur-
rent schemes still introduce a signiﬁcant error percentage in the detec-
tion of fraudulent drivers. Moreover, they usually require toll systems to
be equipped with cameras that take pictures of all the vehicles that pass
through the control points. This behavior may represent a serious privacy
threat for drivers.
This thesis aims at providing security and privacy to new urban Road
Pricing Systems. More precisely, the existing systems have been analyzed
from a fraud and a privacy points of view. From its conclusions, two
new Electronic Road Pricing Systems for Low Emission Zones have been
proposed with the aim of detecting fraud while preserving drivers’ pri-
vacy. In particular, they provide a deterministic fraud control and revocable
anonymity for vehicles that misbehave. Both proposals allow to disperse
trafﬁc from areas with high trafﬁc density with the aim of reducing the pol-
lutant emissions by reducing trafﬁc jams and time spent. However, the way
to address the problem is different in each proposal. In the ﬁrst proposal,
drivers pay depending on the duration of the stay in the LEZ. In the sec-
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ond proposal, drivers pay according to the path they have covered in the
LEZ. They include a security and privacy study, which shows that privacy
is preserved while fraud is detected, and a deployment feasibility study
that shows that the provided proposals are realistic and may be deployed in
practical scenarios.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, the scope and the main issues addressed in this dissertation are
introduced in §1.1. The contributions to the ﬁeld are then brieﬂy described in §1.2.
Finally, the structure and organization of this thesis are presented in §1.3.
Contents
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Contributions of this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3 Structure of this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1 Motivation
In recent years, trafﬁc congestion has become a signiﬁcant problem for al-
most all major cities in the globe. The center of major metropolitan areas
have a huge vehicle concentration in some speciﬁc locations, usually in the
entrance and exit points to the city. The concentration of so many vehicles
commonly causes trafﬁc jams and cause circulation problems.
Trafﬁc congestion has a clear negative impact on their citizens. Nowa-
days, drivers waste a lot of time in their vehicles, for example, when getting
to work, and they consequently suffer stress in many occasions. But these
are not the only problems that derive from trafﬁc congestion. Many citizens,
who cope with trafﬁc congestions every day as bystanders, suffer from air
and noise pollution produced by vehicles. Motor vehicles are a signiﬁcant
source of urban air pollution. However, trafﬁc pollution is originated not
only from the combustion particles, but also from road dust that originates
from the wear of road surfaces, brakes, clutches and tires. Trafﬁc emissions
are the main source of intra-urban variation in the concentrations of air pol-
lutants in many cities [10]. There are a number studies [11, 12, 13] that
show higher levels of pollutants in proximity to roads, and others studies
1
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
[14, 15, 16] have shown an excess of health risks in proximity to roads. It
is also corroborated in the Review of evidence on health aspects of air pol-
lution, presented by OMS in 2013 [17]. They found evidence of increased
health effects linked to trafﬁc emissions.
As a consequence, several organizations and governments have focused
their efforts on reducing air pollution. An example of this is the air quality
guidelines presented by OMS in 2005 [18], which give guidance on ”the way
to reduce air pollution effects on health”. Based on these recommendations,
different European directives, such as 2008/50/CE, limit the level of certain
environmental pollutants. The European Commission has recently adopted
the Clean Air Policy Package, which includes a new strict directive to reduce
pollution, and a Clean Air Programme for Europe with measures to ensure
that the new quality objectives for the period up to 2030 are met.
In order to solve this situation, or at least, reduce air pollution harmful
effects and fulﬁll this legislation, governmental and private institutions have
attempted to ﬁnd suitable solutions that are mainly based on discouraging
people from using their own vehicles. Well-known measures resulting from
these efforts are providing better public transportation services, by intro-
ducing new taxes to the owners of vehicles, High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV)
lanes [19], variable speed city entrances, or by implementing toll systems in
centric urban areas, also known as low emission zones. In [20], authors assert
that low emission zones can substantially reduce local levels of trafﬁc-based
air pollution (particulate matter from trafﬁc dropped by 60%) after the de-
velopment of a low emission zone in Munich.
Among these systems, the use of toll systems has received a lot of atten-
tion. Low-Emission Zone (LEZ) has been adopted in many cities such as
London, Singapore, Tokyo or Beijing [21, 22, 23]. The main reason behind
the success of this method is that it enables an authority to restrict the access
of vehicles for which a fee is assessed according to certain conditions, such
as weight or emissions. In this way, only those drivers that drive in a certain
area of the city have to pay for this concept. This method is especially fa-
mous in Europe, where it is often used for preserving historical city centers
(i.e., Athens or London).
More recently, the European Commission, apart from regulating the limit
of pollutant emissions, also works towards this outcome through the CLARS
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platform (Charging, Low Emission Zones, other Access Regulation Schemes)
due to the novelty of low emission zones. The aim of this platform is to
help and provide information and support, as well as a public information
website1, to public authorities to consider the development of a LEZ as a
measure to improve environmental quality and lower trafﬁc-related health
risks in their cities. As this site shows, there are some different variations of
LEZ depending on the number and the distribution of the zones. The city
of Rome has a multiple LEZ. Speciﬁcally, it has four nested zones; the outer
zone is composed of four adjacent subzones between them. What’s more,
there are cities with Zero-Emission Zone, where only zero-emission vehicles
are allowed.
Since some decades ago, Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) has been used
in highways, tunnels or bridges in order to expedite toll payments as well
as to reduce trafﬁc jams. E-ZPass in USA, AutoPass in Norway or Via
Verde in Portugal are examples of these electronic systems, which try to
reduce the delay and vehicle congestions in toll areas. Likewise, thanks
to new technologies such as the GPS and wireless communication, vehicu-
lar location-based services (VLBS) have been developed with the purpose of
providing information to drivers in relation to their geographic location, and
improving transportation efﬁciency. These ETC systems, considered VLBS,
are known as Electronic Road Pricing (ERP). ERP systems work in a fully
unsupervised way. In this way, Singapore can be considered the leading ex-
ample as it has implemented an electronic road pricing system since 1998,
with variable prices [21]. Similar approaches are being gradually adopted
worldwide. For instance, they are already used in Washington, Georgia, Vir-
ginia and Toronto. In addition to reducing the trafﬁc, ERP systems can use
variable prices to manage the ﬂow of vehicles and, hence, the trafﬁc density.
More speciﬁcally, the trafﬁc authority can increase the toll taxes in congested
roads and suggest drivers to take cheaper routes.
It has been acknowledged that these already deployed toll systems, while
reducing congestion to some extent, exhibit several shortcomings related to
payment fairness, privacy issues, congestion distribution to other routes or
lack of proportionality. One of the most serious problems affects the fraud
control effectiveness and the drivers’ privacy. These problems arise from
1http://urbanaccessregulations.eu/
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the system operations. On the one hand, the use of “spy cameras” like in
the London LEZ case, could lead to an improper registration of fraudulent
vehicles, although some of them would be authorized vehicles. On the other
hand, the registration of the vehicle locations, and also the extensive use of
cameras, could facilitate the monitoring of drivers, thus turning ERP systems
to non-anonymous systems. As a consequence, the scientiﬁc community has
recently focused on this topic in order to design new electronic road pricing
systems that address these drawbacks. The most relevant ERP systems in
the literature are [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9].
1.2 Contributions of this Thesis
A LEZ is an urban area that restricts the access of Vs in exchange for the
payment of a tax in order to reduce the pollutant emissions and improve
trafﬁc problems. In this environment, Electronic Road Pricing systems are of
great help. This dissertation is focused on Electronic Road Pricing systems in
Low Emission Zones. This work especially studies the privacy of drivers and
fraud control mechanisms of LEZ systems.
One of the objectives of this document is to present a survey on the
current ERP systems proposed in the literature. Despite of the fact that
these systems have not particularly been designed for urban zones, they
could easily be adopted in this environment. This state of the art includes a
classiﬁcation and analysis of advantages and disadvantages of the different
kinds of approaches.
This work also contributes to ERP systems by offering two new propos-
als. Based on the study of the current literature, some points of improvement
such as fraud control effectiveness, drivers’ privacy and feasibility of the de-
ployment of ERP systems in real environments, have been identiﬁed and
have been taken into account in two new schemes in order to provide:
• A non-probabilistic fraud control based on the identiﬁcation of fraudu-
lent vehicles and their identiﬁcation by means of two methods: (i) revo-
cable anonymity of dishonest drivers that collaborate with the system,
and (ii) registration of dishonest drivers that do not collaborate with
the system with Checkpoints. These Checkpoints, which are deployed in
the streets by the Service Provider in order to control the access to the
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 5
LEZ by vehicles, are equipped with cameras that only take pictures of
the vehicles that misbehave.
• Privacy for honest drivers. Only dishonest drivers are identiﬁed
through revocable anonymity or registration by Checkpoints and thus,
they are affected by a loss of privacy. Otherwise, honest drivers keep
their privacy because they are not identiﬁed. For this reason, drivers
are expected to collaborate with the system to keep their privacy. That
is, if a driver wants to keep her privacy, she should then behave cor-
rectly and cooperate. In this way, accurate routes of honest drivers are
not obtained and their privacy is preserved. Moreover, OBUs do not
register vehicles’ geolocations.
• Efﬁcient cryptographic primitives are used in these systems in order
to effectively accomplish with the two previous improvements, fraud
control and drivers’ privacy.
Both proposals are designed with the aim to accomplish with the pur-
pose of LEZs, that is to decrease pollutant emissions. The way in which both
solutions try to disperse trafﬁc from areas with high trafﬁc density is differ-
ent. Addressing this problem differently has resulted in two systems with
different features. As far as the ﬁrst one is concerned, a greater user privacy
is provided since this system is not aware of the movements of vehicles in
the LEZ. Regarding the second one, it provides more precision in the pricing
of the LEZ, which could facilitate the management of trafﬁc more accurately
as users are suggested to take less expensive itineraries. However, a increase
in infrastructure investment is required, because stretches of streets are con-
trolled by the ERP system. The choice between one or the other will depend
on the requirements that the system provider wants to obtain.
The ﬁrst proposal is based on a time approach. In this system, drivers
pay depending on the duration of the stay in the LEZ. This proposal allows
to suggest drivers to cover short itineraries in the LEZ, and even to dissuade
the entrance to the LEZ by drivers. This results in a LEZ composed of a
unique zone. However, this scheme can also consider a LEZ with multiple
zones. In this case, a further discrimination of prices is obtained according
to the fragmentation the LEZ. This system follows a post-payment approach
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as, a priori, it is not possible to know how long a vehicle could circulate in
the LEZ.
The second proposal is based on a path approach. In the system pro-
posed, drivers pay according to the path they have covered in the LEZ. Un-
like the ﬁrst proposal, this one allows the distribution of the trafﬁc in the
LEZ. This is achieved by means of the dynamic assignment of prices for
each stretch. As the trafﬁc conditions are constantly changing, the prices are
periodically adapted to such conditions. In such a way, prices are computed
according to the trafﬁc density of the stretch. Then, stretches with high oc-
cupancy are more expensive. Therefore, Ds are suggested to re-plan their
route in order to cover less expensive routes, which depend on the distance
to be covered, the consumption of fuel and the prices of the stretches. In this
proposal, the payment of the tolls follows a pre-payment approach, even
though a post-payment approach could be used.
1.3 Structure of this Document
Chapter 2 surveys and classiﬁes the different existing ERP systems. Each
proposal is described and its main advantages and disadvantages are dis-
cussed. The basics of the two proposals are presented in 3. The contribu-
tions to the ﬁeld are described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. In particular,
Chapter 4 presents a new ERP system based on a time approach. Chapter
5 presents another new ERP, which is based on a path approach. Finally,
Chapter 6 includes the conclusions of the work and the main lines of future
research are described.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
In recent years, several electronic systems dealing with the management of trafﬁc
depending on toll taxes, have been proposed in the literature. The most important
ERP systems are described in §2.1. They are then analyzed and evaluated according
to their fraud control mechanisms and the level of drivers’ privacy in §2.2. Finally,
the conclusions of the previous analysis are stated in §2.3.
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2.1 Related Work
A description of the most important ERP systems that can be found in the
literature are detailed below:
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2.1.1 VPriv [1]
VPriv provides a practical protocol to compute path functions for several
driving-related problems while maintaining a high level of privacy.
In the registration phase, drivers generate a set of commitments contain-
ing different random TAGs previously generated. Ciphertexts of these com-
mitments are sent to the service provider and these are bound to the driver’s
identity. However, TAG values are not known by the service provider in this
phase.
In the driving phase, the vehicle sends time-location tuples together with
a different valid TAG every period of time to the service provider. Then, the
service provider does not know which car uploaded a certain tuple. To en-
sure users uploading the correct data, the authority is required to randomly
record some license plate, location, time tuples, and then challenges drivers
with these records during the payment. It is important that the number
of random observations or checkpoints are kept to a moderate amount to
maintain drivers’ privacy.
At the end of the billing period, the driver has to pay according to the
path driven and has to prove that the tuples uploaded by her are consistent
with these checkpoint evidences. The server then computes and returns all
location fees. Each user adds up her location fees according to her tags and
proves the correctness of the sum to the server by using zero-knowledge
proof, without revealing the ownership of the tags. This process needs to
run several rounds every time to avoid user behaviors deviating from the
system. This protocol is possible thanks to the use of additive pricing func-
tions which support the use of homomorphic commitments whereby the
drivers commit to the prices for each segment of their path as well as the
sum of the prices.
Therefore, the product of the commitments is a commitment of the sum
of the prices. This eliminates the need for a protocol to verify that the sum
of segment prices was computed correctly.
Even though this protocol uses a secure two-party computation to make
sure drivers cannot cheat on the total tolling price, this computation and
communication overhead increases linearly with the number of rounds ex-
ecuted and with the number of users. In addition, the communication es-
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tablished between drivers and the service provider has to be anonymous in
order to upload the road segments they drove. To avoid linking drivers to
their IP address, they must use an anonymizing network such as Tor.
Additionally, this system tries to solve other issues like speeding detec-
tion and insurance pricing.
2.1.2 A group signature based electronic toll pricing system [2]
This system is based on VPriv’s idea of computing fees in the server from the
time-location data of vehicles. Unlike other systems, the vehicles are divided
by a trusted authority into groups. For every ﬁxed period, the OBU of each
vehicle signs its location records using a group signature scheme before and
sends them to the toll server. In each billing period the toll server sends each
driver all the attached location data associated to her group, together with
the fee of each record. According to the local records of her own location
tuples, the client adds up the fees and sends the sum to the server. After
adding all client payments, the server checks whether the sum equals the
sum of all location fees. If this is the case, the server collects the correct
amount of tolls and spots the protocol. Otherwise, clients could be making
incorrect payments. The group manager then determines the misbehaviors
by opening location signatures, and computes the real toll payment for each
client.
The group signature scheme preserves client anonymity in groups. That
is, other entities won’t be able to learn who in the group signs the message.
Only the group manager has the ability to reveal the signer’s identity. The
toll server computes the fees by collecting anonymous location records from
clients on roads, and by returning each cost of location to clients during toll
calculation.
However, this system does not have any other fraud control mechanism
that considers other possible system malfunctions. They assume“that all
data generated by OBUs are reliable and trustworthy” and “OBUs are is-
sued by the authority and built according to modern tamper-resistant tech-
niques”. They also consider that “the only way to generate false location
tuples is signal spooﬁng which is not practical as signal simulators are avail-
able at a cost that signiﬁcantly outweighs the saving of toll payment”. An-
other assumption made by authors is that “location tuples are transmitted
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to the toll servers anonymously”. A part from that, this systems do not use
either fraud control mechanisms such as random observations while driv-
ing, or audit processes for testing the time-location data sent by vehicles
according to the checkpoint photographs at the billing period.
2.1.3 Privacy-friendly electronic trafﬁc pricing via commits [3]
In this system, similarly to VPriv, the server collects location data. In this
case, hash values of the trip records are used as location data. Drivers com-
mit to the path they drove without revealing the individual road segments.
The system uses hash functions for commitments, thus making it very ef-
ﬁcient. Only additive road pricing functions are allowed (i.e., functions for
which the cost of driving along a path is the sum of the cost of driving along
each segment of the path); this allows a protocol to verify that the total fee
has correctly computed as the sum of each road segment price by revealing
a path from the root to a single leaf in a Merkle hash tree. In addition, this
system uses checkpoints to verify that the driver faithfully reported each
road segment on which she drove.
2.1.4 Privacy enhanced fraud resistant road pricing [4]
This article notes that in systems such as VPriv or PrETP, the audit proto-
col allows the government to query cars about locations where there is no
camera, a capability that could be misused, for example, to identify whistle-
blowers. They propose a privacy-preserving tolling system in which ve-
hicles can be spot-checked only in places where their presence is actually
recorded, and in which overall driver privacy is guaranteed as long as the
pricing provider and aggregation provider do not collaborate. Like VPriv,
Hoepman and Huitem’s system requires road segments to be transmitted
from the car to the authority over an anonymizing network.
2.1.5 PrETP [5]
PrETP proposes the use of a trusted tamper-resistant hardware in each car
to locally calculate the fees according to the vehicle path. While driving,
the on-board unit of the vehicle collects location data and slices them in
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segments (loc,time). For each collected segment, the OBU commits to each
one.
This fact requires the use of a cryptographic protocol, called Optimistic
Payment, in order to prove to the service provider that these calculations are
carried out correctly. The Optimistic Payment, which is based on homomor-
phic commitments and signature schemes that allow zero-knowledge proofs
of signature possession, allows on-board units to send the service provider
the ﬁnal fee commitments to the locations and prices used in the fee com-
putation. These commitments do not reveal information on the locations
or prices to the service provider. Moreover, they ensure that drivers cannot
claim that they are located in any other place or that have used different
prices to those used to create the commitments.
At the end of the billing period, the OBU generates, signs and sends the
service provider a payment message containing the total fee computation
and the commitments of the segments. The service provider then veriﬁes
the signature and checks that the aggregation of all sub-fees is well done.
In addition, in order to check the veracity of the committed values, the ser-
vice provider has access to a proof such as a photograph placing a vehicle
in a speciﬁc point at a particular time. The service provider challenges the
corresponding on-board unit by requesting a proof, thus proving that the lo-
cation point where it is spotted is correct and that it is used in the calculation
of the ﬁnal fee. The on-board unit must open the commitment containing
these locations, thus revealing only the location data and the price at the mo-
ment speciﬁed in the proof. For each client, only the total payment amount
and location-time tuples in the physical vicinity of random checkpoints are
revealed.
PrETP addresses some of the shortcomings in VPriv. In PrETP, drivers
do not reveal the road segments they drive in the clear, so they do not need
an anonymizing network. Instead, they commit to the locations and to the
prices used in the fee computation; in the audit protocol, they open the com-
mitments corresponding to the road segments where checkpoint cameras
observed them. However, the lack of location data collection may deprive
the system from the chance to assist the government with policy making for
public interest, or to solve legal issues when needed.
Based on the same idea of PrETP, the same authors present a pay-as-you-
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drive insurance system called PriPAYD.
2.1.6 Milo [6]
Milo is a modiﬁcation of the PrETP system that has the aim to improve
effectiveness of fraud detection, which depends on the ignorance of the lo-
cation and the number of checkpoints by drivers. This drawback is not a
speciﬁc problem of the PrETP system, but it is shared by others, such as
VPriv, based on the idea of controlling fraud detection with the use of ran-
dom checkpoints. In particular, this system ﬁghts against the possibility of
drivers colluding to learn the spot-checking locations. This solution uses
blind identity-based encryption to avoid revealing these locations to drivers.
However, this article concludes that in practice, there is a gap between the
assumption that checkpoints are unpredictable and the use of real-world
cameras used to implement them. In addition, an increase in the amount of
checkpoints affects the drivers’ privacy: “If drivers are able to avoid some
cameras, more of them will be required; if too many spot-check cameras are
deployed, the records they generate will themselves degrade driver privacy.
We believe that it is important for working on privacy-preserving tolling to
address this limitation by carefully considering how the spot checks it relies
on will be implemented“.
2.1.7 SPEcTRe [7]
SPEcTRe improves the PrETP implementation by reducing the number of
tolling points while maintaining driver honesty and privacy. It is the ﬁrst
system to use e-cash (by Chaum or others) to pay for driving. In VPriv,
PrETP and Milo, spot-checks are necessary to uncover dishonest drivers.
SPEcTRe maintains the same level of privacy as these other schemes for
drivers, in the sense that in all these schemes, location-time information of
a vehicle is only revealed at checkpoints. Their authors present two variants
of the system: the spot-record scheme and the no-record scheme.
In the ﬁrst scheme, the driver has a set of pre-generated tokens which are
signed by the service provider and which include a correspondence with the
license plate. During the driving, the driver broadcasts tokens in a certain
period. A veriﬁer secretly monitors drivers at random locations and times.
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For each driver, the veriﬁer takes a picture of the driver’s license plate and
records all tokens broadcasted. Each photograph has a set of tokens associ-
ated. The service provider then veriﬁes that the signatures are valid for each
picture, and that there are no repeated signatures. At the end of the billing
period, the driver interacts with the payment server to redeem unused to-
kens, and she pays for the tokens used. The service provider veriﬁes that
tokens have not been collected by checkpoints. The possibility to pay for
the tokens at the generation phase is proposed as an alternative to the post-
payment scheme. The effectiveness of the system is based on the ignorance
of the checkpoint time-location by drivers. If it is discovered, the system
fails. In the same way as other systems, such as PrETP or Vpriv, the increase
in the number of checkpoints affects the privacy of drivers who always take
the same routes at the same time.
In the second scheme, the use of a wireless communication technology,
which is able to determine which car is sending which token (directional
antennas or triangulation), is assumed. The driver obtains a set of eCash
tokens from the system provider at the beginning. While driving, the driver
broadcasts tokens at a predetermined rate. The veriﬁer checks the tokens.
If the signature of the token is not valid, or the driver is not broadcasting
tokens all the time, the veriﬁer takes a photograph. In this point, the system
is based on the good will of the veriﬁer. At the end of the billing period,
the tokens are invalidated, and the driver then interacts with the payment
server to redeem unused tokens, and she pays for the tokens used. The
invalidation can be done by using different public keys for each period of
time. Double spending is an important issue addressed by the system in
order to maintain a sorted and uniﬁed (centralized) list of detected tokens.
If the checkpoint location is discovered, the effectiveness of the system also
fails, and tokens from honest drivers can indeed be stolen. However, the
privacy of the driver is guaranteed if the token generation is made through
an anonymous channel.
In both variants, as in the rest of the systems of the literature, even as-
suming that drivers cannot detect the checkpoints, the detection of fraud-
ulent drivers is not completely guaranteed. It depends on the number of
checkpoints. In this case, it also depends on the fraction of spent tokens
which are detected by veriﬁers. In addition, they have neither intensive nor
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interactive computation on OBU.
2.1.8 Cell-based privacy-friendly roadpricing [8, 9]
In this system, a road pricing area is ﬁxed by a square of cells with a rela-
tively small size. When a vehicle enters a cell, it has to pay a certain amount
of money. In this case, the fee computation depends on the covered cells.
A certain subset of cells are marked as checkpoints. They contain a hidden
camera, which is placed randomly for a certain period of time. The secure
element (SE) of the OBU knows the location of the camera checkpoints. The
OBU then notices the SE when the vehicle enters a cell. The SE generates a
ticket whose content depends on whether the cell has a checkpoint or not.
This information will be later useful for fraud detection. The SE is trusted so
it can simply accumulate the fees per cell, store the result in this non-volatile
memory, and report the cumulative fee to the service provider at the end of
the reporting period. The service provider trusts the accumulation of fees
reported by the SE, although it does not believe that the SE has been notiﬁed
appropriately by the OBU at every cell transition. The service provider then
checks the tickets provided by the OBU in the reporting period. The service
provider can open the tickets for the checkpoint cells where the vehicle has
been spotted, and it can check whether the content is appropriate. This sys-
tem also provides a parking and insurance solution by following the main
idea.
2.2 Analysis of System Features
In this section, The most important features of these systems are analyzed,
and they are then classiﬁed according to these features. This classiﬁcation is
outlined in table 2.1.
1. Segment collection based on OBUs: All these systems require that
an on-board unit (OBU) is equipped in every vehicle in order to col-
lect and send information related to the geographical position of the
vehicle and the fees related to that speciﬁc path. Depending on the
importance of the role played by the OBU in the system, the systems
can be classiﬁed according to the use of:
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• Thin OBU: [1, 3, 4] and [2] systems in which the OBU (or SE)
of the vehicle commits itself to each step of the fee calculation
and stores it in a database of users’ travel history at server. After
receiving the fee report, the service provider may ask the OBU
to open certain commitments, corresponding to roadside camera
locations, in order to check details of the cumulative report.
• Fat OBU: In [5, 6, 8, 9] and [7] systems, locations and tolls are
managed by user devices while servers are allowed to process
only aggregated data.
Both categories have advantages and disadvantages. Hiding locations
from servers reduces concerns about location privacy drastically. How-
ever, the load for user devices is considerable. Typically, devices have
to manage the storage of locations and try to convince servers to not
have cheated, e.g., using of zero-knowledge proofs. On the other side,
the availability of location databases collected by servers like in VPriv
can help improve applications such as trafﬁc monitoring and control al-
though the integration of multiple systems should be carried out care-
fully, whereas solutions to preserve location privacy become a manda-
tory requirement.
2. Broadband communication based: All the systems described require
the use of a broadband connection in the vehicle in order to intercom-
municate information between vehicle’s On-Board Units and SP server
periodically. Commonly, in the systems based on thin OBU, registered
vehicle paths are transmitted periodically. In the systems based on fat
OBU, feed data are sent just at the end of each billing period control.
3. Location based on GPS. In all these systems, the OBU needs to obtain
vehicle locations by using a GPS receiver in order to generate time-
location tuples periodically.
4. Post payment time: In all the proposed systems in the literature, [1,
3, 4, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], fees are computed from the path covered by the
vehicle at the end of the billing period. The payment is performed
afterwards according to such fees, i.e. monthly. This mode requires
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interaction or reconciliation between the driver and the system after
service, at the billing period.
5. Fraud Control based on random camera checkpoints: In all these
systems, the fraud is controlled by recording vehicle plates at vari-
ous checkpoints placed randomly along the roads. These checkpoints
(Chps), supplied with cameras, shoot every vehicle passing through in
order to place them on record. After each billing period, the ERP sys-
tem, with all the evidence taken by the checkpoints, challenges drivers
to prove that their path contains the location of each checkpoint. The
effectiveness of this mechanism depends strictly on the drivers’ igno-
rance of the location of checkpoints.
OBU Type Broadband GPS Payment Fraud Control
Systems Thin Fat Comm. Location Pre Post based on Chp
[1]     
[2]     
[3]     
[4]     
[5]     
[6]     
[7]     
[9]     
Table 2.1: System Features
2.3 Conclusions of the State of the Art
In general, all ERP systems that can be found in the literature ([1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 9]) calculate road usage pricing by considering the vehicle itinerary, and
they use on-board units (OBU), equipped in each vehicle, to record its path.
OBUs are enabled with GPS and wireless communication capabilities; they
periodically collect their geographical position; and they send it to a service
provider (or similar) together with other relevant data.
Even though ERPs share common features, they mainly differ in the way
the road usage fees are computed. In [1, 3, 4, 2], OBUs send information
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of the covered path to an external server, property of a Service Provider
(SP), which prices the itinerary according to its path in every billing period.
Therefore, SP is in charge of calculating the fees in each billing period, ac-
cording to the vehicle path. By contrast, in [5, 6, 9, 7], fees are calculated
locally in each OBU, and they are then sent, as a unique sum, to the SP
server in every pricing period. In this case, the information disclosure re-
lated to the vehicle location is minimal. In order to achieve it, cryptographic
proofs are used to demonstrate that OBU has been honest in the fee calculus
and aggregation.
Fraud control is an important objective to be accomplished by ERP sys-
tems. All these systems are designed to prevent any possible misbehavior
by the drivers that would enable them to save money illegally. Disconnect-
ing the OBU or modifying the ﬂow of data generated by this device in any
way are possible examples of misconduct. In order to avoid these situations,
these proposals adopt control mechanisms based on the use of checkpoints
(Chps), with the aim to test their honesty. Chp are equipped with cameras
and they are randomly located in the restricted areas. Chps take pictures of
all the vehicles that pass through them. In this way, their plate number is
stored together with the different geo-positions and the exact time of each
one. These three items allow the system to build a partial path of all the ve-
hicles moving around the restricted area, and to verify that a certain driver
has not altered the set of positions recorded by her car’s OBU and provided
to the SP during the billing period. It is worth mentioning that this approach
for fraud detection has a certain failure probability that directly depends on
the number of Chps deployed in the restricted area, and it also depends on
preventing drivers from ascertaining their exact position in advance.
In the evaluated systems, the achievement of a high level of drivers’ pri-
vacy and the detection of fraud at the same time is a trade-off. When a high
detection level is requested, privacy is affected and vice versa. Increasing
the number of checkpoints that are deployed in a restricted area directly af-
fects drivers’ privacy due to the fact that, the more checkpoints there are,
the bigger the set of registered real drivers’ locations will be; and, there-
fore, the more accurate the drivers’ paths will be. Note that drivers’ privacy
directly depends on the accuracy of the paths that the system can build
by using drivers’ recorded locations. Besides, if Chps are randomly moved
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every so often, and vehicle paths follow a routine (i.e. going to work), pre-
cision could even improve though privacy would be affected. Therefore, if
the system knows the whole path of a certain driver with high accuracy,
her whereabouts are no longer private. In this way, in order to preserve the
drivers’ privacy, the way checkpoints behave should be revised.
Furthermore, all these proposals rely on the wrong assumption that
checkpoint locations are unpredictable by drivers, and this issue makes
those schemes unable to effectively control drivers potential misbehavior
(or fraud), as it is stated in the work presented in [6]. This fact, in turn,
represents a relevant problem that clearly limits the deployability of those
schemes in real environments.
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Chapter 3
Fundamentals of the Proposals
In this chapter, the basics, which are based on the two proposals of this dissertation,
are established. In §3.1, the need for an authentication of users while preserving
privacy is stated. Considering this requirement, an analysis of several authentication
methods is then performed. Finally, an authentication scheme accomplishing with
the ﬁxed requirements, which will be used in the thesis’ proposals, is presented in
§3.2.
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3.1 Dealing with Fraud and Privacy: Authentication
with Revocable Anonymity
In order to accomplish with LEZs’ goals, fraud has to be effectively con-
trolled. For this reason, the access to LEZs has to be controlled by the sys-
tem, in which each user is veriﬁed to have fairly paid. This control could be
performed using toll barriers. However, they usually slow down the trafﬁc
and can even cause trafﬁc jams. A system without barriers is then preferred
in order not to affect trafﬁc at tolls. In this way, the system should facilitate
the entry of all users into the LEZ by identifying the users who have not
paid correctly. The offenders could then be sanctioned.
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Conversely, honest users should not be identiﬁed, and their privacy
should be preserved as long as they follow the rules. Contrariwise, the ERP
system could learn other sensitive information apart from users’ identity,
such as users’ location, itineraries, or even their workplace.
As a result, users are therefore encouraged to prove that they are legit-
imate users without disclosing their identity. Their identity would only be
revealed in case of fraud.
Signatures and Pseudonyms are cryptographic techniques that could ad-
dress these requirements, which are widely used in similar applications such
as vehicular networks (VANETs) ([24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]).
Signatures offer authenticity, non-repudiation and integrity. However,
signatures do not preserve signers’ privacy on their own since their issuers
are identiﬁed. Instead, group signature schemes ([24, 25, 26, 30, 31]) provide
a member of a group to anonymously sign on behalf of the group, and can
therefore be anonymously authenticated. In addition, these schemes offer
revocable anonymity of the signers.
Group signatures are also widely used in vehicular systems with such
purpose ([24, 25, 26, 27]). However, they cannot be accommodated in this
work for several reasons: (i) considering that one of the aims of ERP sys-
tems is to reduce trafﬁc jams, they require efﬁcient operations. In this way,
vehicles have to authenticate nonstop with the system. The computational
cost of a signature and of the veriﬁcation could be too high to achieve it
([30, 31, 32]), especially if they are performed in an On Board Unit; and
(ii) secret keys, which are used in the signature, have to be protected from
thefts or relinquish other users in order to authenticate correctly, since this
could lead users to commit fraud. For this reason, it is convenient to use
a tamper-proof device in order to securely store the keys and to carry out
group signatures. The authors ignore the existence of tamper-proof devices
supporting group signatures with affordable prices in the current market.
While it is true that a custom-made Hardware Security Module (HSM) could
accomplish with these requirements, it has a high economic cost. As a con-
sequence, the use of this kind of hardware is not considered in this work
due to its economical unfeasibility, bearing in mind that each vehicle must
have one of these devices installed.
The use of pseudonyms is another technique widely used in order to
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prevent users’ anonymity ([33]). However, the privacy they offer is weak
because they suffer from linkability, that is, several authentications from the
same user can be connected. In ERP systems, it could be a serious pri-
vacy problem since different entrances of the same user in the LEZ could
be linked, and sensitive information could then be inferred. In the liter-
ature, some proposals ([28, 34, 35, 29]) solve this issue by using a set of
pseudonyms for each user. One different pseudonym can then be used each
time. Even so, this solution presents a usability problem since the set of
pseudonyms is ﬁnite. As the existence of methods solving this issue re-
mains unknown to the authors, pseudonyms are neither considered in this
scenario.
3.2 Privacy Authentication with Revocable Anonymity
Scheme
As it has been stated above, non of the authentication methods mentioned
above fulﬁll the requirements of the authentication that an ERP system
needs. For this reason, an authentication scheme based on the RSA signature
is proposed.
In this scheme, a set of groups of users is ﬁxed. Each user is then regis-
tered in one of these groups, in which users are distributed homogeneously.
For each group of users, a Certiﬁcation Authority CA is generated. This CA is
then transferred to each user of the group. In this way, users belonging to
the same group share the same CA.
Each member of the group has access to her CA, which allows her to
generate public key pairs and their public key certiﬁcates. In particular,
each public key certiﬁcate:
1. Does not contain information of the user and any other identifying
data. In this case, public key is then used as a pseudonym and users
are able to generate new credentials whenever they need it. In this
way, they can avoid linkability in each authentication.
2. Has an extension containing a user’s identiﬁer probabilistically en-
crypted with the public key of a trusted party. This party, which is
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
22 CHAPTER 3. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE PROPOSALS
constituted by a set of m members, securely generates the asymmet-
ric key pair with a threshold scheme ([36]). Therefore, the secret key
is divided into m prices or shares. Hence, anonymity can only be re-
voked by this entity if at least t from m members collaborate with the
decryption of the extension.
3. Does not contain any value that can be linked with previous certiﬁcates
that belong to the same user. Neither can the issuer (CA) be used to
link certiﬁcates belonging to the same user since there is a set of users
sharing the same CA.
At this point, users are able to anonymously sign on behalf of the group,
and so be anonymously authenticated. In case of fraud, at least t from m
members could revoke users’ anonymity.
In spite of this, users would be able to modify the ciphered extension in
order to commit fraud without being identiﬁed. Consequently, they may au-
thenticate with the system, but they may never be de-anonymized in case of
fraud. For this reason, a Secure Element SE, which is a low-cost tamper-proof
device that offers efﬁcient RSA functionalities, is used in order to generate
and keep users’ credentials securely. In particular, each SE is provided by a
trusted entity, such as a competent trafﬁc authority, which registers users in a
group and securely installs the corresponding CA in the SE. Up to this point,
SEs are then able to securely and dynamically generate public key pairs and
their public key certiﬁcates, including the extension with the ciphered iden-
tiﬁer. They are also able to sign messages using these credentials. All these
sensitive operations are performed in the SE and thus, users are not able to
modify the certiﬁcate without being detected.
Hence, the authentication scheme (i) preserves the user’s privacy
whereas she collaborates with the system, since the used credentials do not
contain identifying information of the user and they cannot be linked with
other credentials belonging to the same user; (ii) offers revocable anonymity
thanks to the use of an extension containing a ciphered user identiﬁer, which
can only be opened by a trusted entity; (iii) uses efﬁcient cryptographic
primitives (RSA), which provide non-repudiation, integrity and authentic-
ity with the signature; (iv) protects the generation of the credentials, their
storage and the execution of the mentioned cryptographic primitives from
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attackers by using a SE.
Note that the two ERP systems proposed in this work use this authen-
tication scheme and their design follows the same idea of underlying this
authentication method in order to preserve users’ privacy while they collab-
orate.
The generation of the certiﬁcates used in this authentication scheme is
composed of three phases: Certiﬁcation Setup, Certiﬁcate Authority Installation
and Certiﬁcate Generation. In the ﬁrst phase, CAs are generated for each
group of users. In the second phase, a user is registered in one of these
groups of users and a CA is installed in the SE. In the third phase, the SE,
which has been previously initialized, generates new credentials.
3.2.1 Certiﬁcation Setup
In this phase, a trafﬁc-competent authority, such as Vehicle Certiﬁcation Au-
thority VCA, deﬁnes a set of groups of users and generates a different CA for
each group. VCA then needs to:
i. Securely generate an asymmetric key pair (PkVCA, SkVCA)
ii. Securely obtain a CA certiﬁcate certVCA, which has a chain length of 1,
and a certiﬁcate repository of the authorities from competent authorities
(i.e. transit authority)
iii. Deﬁne a set of vehicles V = {v1, v2, ..., vnumV}, where numV = |V| is the
number of vehicles
iv. Deﬁne a collection of sets K = {C1,C2, ...,CnumK} partition of V, where
numK = |K|, with |Ci| = numC, ∀i ∈ [0, numK)
v. Generate and associate a certiﬁcation authority VCACi to each element
of the subset K (C1, ...,CnumK ):
v.i. An asymmetric key pair
(PkVCACi , SkVCACi ), ∀i ∈ {1, ..., numK}
v.ii. A CA certiﬁcate certVCACi , ∀i ∈ {1, ..., numK}, which has a certiﬁ-
cate chain length of 0
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3.2.2 Certiﬁcate Authority Installation
In this phase, a trafﬁc competent authority, such as Vehicle Certiﬁcation Au-
thority VCA, registers a user in a group of users and installs the correspond-
ing Certiﬁcation Authority in a SE. The process is carried out from time to
time according to the revocation and renewal certiﬁcate policies adopted.
VCA then needs to:
1. Register V in an element of the subset K (in a Ci)
2. Download the following data in the SE by means of a secure channel:
• A certiﬁcate repository of certiﬁcation authorities
• Identifying information of the vehicle Vid (i.e. its license plate)
and its technical speciﬁcations (i.e. owner, power or emissions of
pollutant gases).
• The certiﬁcation authority VCACi associated to Ci consisting of
PkVCACi , SkVCACi and certVCACi
3.2.3 Certiﬁcate Generation
In this phase, the Secure Element generates new credentials. This phase is
performed whenever a user wants before the authentication. The SE, which
has a certiﬁcation entity VCACi installed, then needs to:
1. Compute an asymmetric key pair (PkVq , SkVq)
2. Generate a public key certiﬁcate certVq with the following features:
• An extension certVq .idS containing the probabilistic encryption
(i.e. by using OAEP padding [37], standardized later in PKCS
#1v2 and RFC 2437) of the vehicle identiﬁer Vid with the public
key of PA: certVq .idS = EncPkPA(Vid)
• An extension certVq .em containing the pollutant emission category
(i.e. European Emission Standards) of the V
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Chapter 4
Time-based Electronic Road
Pricing System for Low
Emission Zones Preserving
Drivers’ Privacy
In this chapter, an Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) system, which is designed specif-
ically for cities with Low-Emission Zones, is proposed. The aim of this system is
to detect fraud and to preserve drivers’ privacy. This system is based on a time
approach, in which drivers pay depending on the duration of the stay in the LEZ.
The novelty of the system is introduced in §4.1. The system is modeled in §4.2. In
§4.3, the scheme is overviewed. Afterwards, the scheme is divided in three protocols,
Entrance/Departure Protocol (§4.4), Payment Protocol (§4.5) and Sanction Protocol
(§4.6). Finally, security and privacy are evaluated in §4.7, and performance and
feasibility are presented in §4.8.
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4.1 Novelty of the Approach
In this chapter, a new ERP system for LEZs is proposed. It is based on a
time approach with the aim of providing fraud control and honest drivers’
privacy through revocable anonymity. In this way, tolls are ﬁxed according
to the trafﬁc density of the LEZ, and drivers then pay according to the time
spent in it. As a result, drivers are suggested to cover short itineraries,
and even to dissuade drivers from entering the LEZ. This system can also
consider a LEZ with multiple zones, which provides a greater management
of the trafﬁc. This system follows a post-payment approach as, a priori, it is
not possible to know how long a vehicle could circulate in the LEZ.
All the systems described in Section 2 ([1, 3, 4, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]) penalize the
privacy of honest or dishonest vehicles by taking a photo of them in different
places. The price they pay for circulating in this kind of systems is a loss of
privacy. Otherwise, in the system proposed here, only dishonest drivers are
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photographed and they are thus affected by a loss of privacy. In this case, the
Chps, who are also equipped with cameras, only register fraudulent vehicles,
thus keeping honest drivers’ privacy. For this reason, drivers are expected to
collaborate with the system to keep their privacy, that is, if a driver wants to
keep her privacy, she should then behave correctly and cooperate. She will
otherwise loses it. Moreover, in the system proposed, the OBU of the vehicle
does not register its location and fraud control is non-probabilistic.
The resulting scheme has been tested in order to assess the feasibility
deployment of the parts of the system with high temporary restrictions, and
the results show that that the provided proposal is realistic and may be
deployed in practical scenarios.
The new ERP system, which is presented in this chapter, is supported
by:
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Macia` Mut Puigserver, Magdalena Payeras-Capella`,
Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Electronic Road Pricing System
for Low Emission Zones to Preserve Driver Privacy” In 11th Interna-
tional Conference Modeling Decisions for Artiﬁcial Intelligence (MDAI 2014)
pp. 1–13. 2014.
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Macia` Mut Puigserver, Magdalena Payeras-Capella`,
Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Time-based Electronic Road Pric-
ing System for Low Emission Zones Preserving Drivers’ Privacy” In
International Journal of Computer Communications 2015. Under review.
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Macia` Mut Puigserver, Magdalena Payeras-Capella`,
Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Sistema de Telepeaje en Zonas
Urbanas” In XIII Reunio´n Espanola de Criptografı´a y Seguridad de la Infor-
macio´n (RECSI’14). (XIII Spanish Meeting on Cryptography and Informa-
tion Security). pp. 93–99. 2014.
4.2 System Model
This section presents a system that is modeled by describing the participat-
ing actors, the requirements to be met and the several and possibly opposite
interests of the actors involved.
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Key Name Description
D Driver Person who drive a V
V Vehicle Means of transport, which is driven by a D
OBU On Board Unit Device installed in each V,
which executes the protocol in a V
SE Secure Element Tamper-proof device that executes
sensitive operations in a V
SP Service Provider Manager of a LEZ
Chp Checkpoint Points of control deployed in the entrance/exit of a LEZ
VCA Vehicle Certiﬁcation Authority The authority who certiﬁes Vs
PA Punishment Authority The authority who evaluates incidences
and punishes fraudulent Vs
Table 4.1: Entity Table
4.2.1 Actors Involved
The proposal considers different actors. Driver D is the person who drives a
vehicle in a LEZ. Vehicle V is the means of transport registered by a unique D,
who is the owner of the vehicle, yet the vehicle may be driven by severalDs.
V has an identiﬁer (the vehicle plate) that connects it to the owner. Secure ele-
ment SE is a tamper-proof security module installed by the competent trafﬁc
authority in each V. It performs all the sensitive operations needed to meet
the security requirements. On-board unit OBU is installed in each V. It has
more computational power and storage capacity than SE. The device con-
nects SE with the user and performs the less sensitive protocol operations.
It has a location capability (GPS). Service Provider SP offers an ERP service
for urban areas thanks to a concession contract with the local public admin-
istration (i.e. City Council). This entity has the right to offer this service and
is responsible for managing the system. SP installs the checkpoints in the
restricted zone. Checkpoint Chp aims to control the access of vehicles that en-
ter (Chps of entrance) or leave (Chps of exit) the zone. Chps are considered
trustworthy and will never take photographs indiscriminately as long as
their behavior is optimistic. Vehicle certiﬁcation authority VCA provides keys
and certiﬁcates to Vs. Punishment Authority PA is a trusted entity composed
by different sub-entities or authorities. The collaboration of a minimum set
of sub-entities allows them to know and reveal the identity of the owner of
the V in case of fraud.
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4.2.2 Requirements
The system requirements related with fraud, privacy, authenticity and tech-
nology, are described below in order to establish the foundations of the sys-
tem.
Anti-fraud Requirements
When a V enters or exits a LEZ through a Chp, they obtain proof-of-entrance
γi or proof-of-departure γo. This γi contains information to prove that a
speciﬁc V enters the LEZ through a speciﬁc Chp at a speciﬁc hour. This
proof is considered valid when it cannot be modiﬁed once generated without
detection (integrity), when its issuers can prove that it is their generation
(proofs’ authenticity), and also when they cannot deny its authorship (non-
repudiation). Each proof is linked to a V and a Chp. The link between a proof
and a V guarantees that the token cannot be used by another V’, neither
in a voluntary nor in an involuntary way. This avoids the duplicity of a
proof when a fraudulent V’ tries to use the same proof at the same time. SP
assures that all the Ds pay correctly. If this is not the case, SP identiﬁes the
offending Ds and generates evidences to prove it. The fraud is committed
by a D, and detected by the system, when D drives in a LEZ without a γi,
with an invalid γi, with a valid γi but associated with another V, or if she doesn’t
pay correctly in the exit. A SP cannot falsely accuse an honest D of fraud (an
honest D should not be defenseless). A false accusation takes place when a
SP unjustly claims that a V does not have a γi, has an invalid proof, has a valid
proof belonging to another V, or if she doesn’t pay correctly in the exit.
However, both proofs, γi γo, can be used as evidences by the users to
refute a false accusation.
Authenticity Requirements
At the entrance and at the exit of a LEZ,Vs and Chps exchange information.
When the communication is established, both parts, V and Chp must prove
its identity to the other part. This way, each one can be sure that the protocol
is executed with the right entity. If this is not the case, this action must be
reported.
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Privacy Requirements
The fraud control executed by SP can endanger the privacy of the Ds. In
this case, the curiosity of SP could cause an excessive monitoring of the
system or even could trace the itinerary of a speciﬁc V. With the aim of
avoiding this excessive control over the Vs by SP, the system must (i) assure
the anonymity (the identity of D or V cannot be linked to any itinerary);
(ii) avoid the traceability (SP mustn’t know the itinerary of an unidentiﬁed
V); and (iii) provide revocable anonymity to D (if a D commits fraud, SP
needs her identity in order to punish her and for this reason, the identity is
revealed).
Functional Requirements
The communication between Vs and Chps needs to (i) be started when a V
is close to a Chp, (ii) let Chp communicate with the nearest V, and (iii) be
carried out when a V is moving. The communication has to start when a V
is detected near from a Chp, for example by means of the broadcast of the
information required to establish the communication. This broadcast can be
carried out by the use of Bluetooth Low Energy technology. Moreover, the
communication in movement can be possible by combining low and medium
distance communication technologies, such as Wimax, ZigBee IEEE 802.15.4
or Bluetooth IEEE 802.15.1, using directional antennas or triangulation. Fi-
nally, the communication technology and the computation required by the
protocol must be quick enough to communicate a Chp and a Vs without
stopping.
Whatever interaction with the D should be easy and agile. The electronic
payment system required in the system should be anonymous and untrace-
able.
4.2.3 Adversary Model
Interests of Ds and SP could be conﬂicting. On the one hand, Ds wish to
save money, sometimes in a dishonest way and taking action against the
system. On the other hand, SP could compromise Ds’ privacy because, in
case of fraud, knowing the identity could be helpful. In addition, SP, who
is desiring to earn more money, could take dishonest actions against Vs,
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by falsely accusing them of fraud. As a result, fraud control and privacy
protection could become opposed objectives.
4.3 General Overview
The following section introduces a description of the overall scheme of the
LEZ system as follows:
The system entities (4.4.1: Setup and 4.4.2: Certiﬁcation) are initialized
before starting the system. Further, SP prices the LEZ (4.5.1: Price gener-
ation), per time unit and emission category, and sends each Chp a list of
prices signed by the competent entity. SP repeats these operations every
time prices are updated.
SE generates different credentials for V (4.4.3: Certiﬁcate generation) ev-
ery time it enters a LEZ (i.e. when the vehicle’s engine is started up or just
when the D is aware of her intentions of entering a LEZ) in order to correctly
authenticate with Chps and avoid linkability between their itineraries.
A vehicle V entering a LEZ (4.4.4: Check-in) communicates with a Chp
and they authenticate each other. Only when the authentication with V fails,
Chp takes a picture of the V number plate as evidence of the infringement
with which a proof-of-entrance-incidence ζi is generated. ζi is sent to PA so
as to verify the existence of fraud, and in order to apply the corresponding
sanction. If the authentication is correct, V gets a proof-of-entrance γi that
includes the entry time.
When a V exits the LEZ (4.4.5: Check-out), it communicates with a Chp
and they authenticate each other. In the case of a successful authentication
with V,Chp informs V about the exit time and the destination account for
payment through a proof-of-departure γo, which is presented as a receipt. In
the case of an authentication failure, Chp takes a picture of V as a proof-of-
departure-incidence ζo, and it is sent to PA.
D computes the amount to pay using γi and γo, within a speciﬁc period
of time after the departure. The amount to pay will be set depending on the
length of the stay and its emission category. Then, the D makes a transaction
through an electronic payment system, and a proof-of-payment γp is sent to
Chp.
In the ﬁgure 4.1, the graphic of Check-in and Check-out steps are showed.
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Figure 4.1: Entrance/Departure scheme
The payment veriﬁcation (4.5.3: Payment veriﬁcation) is done by SP ev-
ery certain period of time (i.e. monthly). SP uses each pair of γi and γo as-
sociated to a same V, to compute the amount of money that V should have
correctly paid. Therefore, it checks whether the transaction corresponds
with the calculated amount. If that veriﬁcation is not successful, SP sends
PA a proof-of-payment-incidence ζp, which contains both γi and γo.
Finally, PA corroborates every ζ received (4.6: Sanction). PA only reveals
the identity of the V owner (anonymity is revoked) when fraud is veriﬁed.
Therefore, PA requires V to send evidences to refute the accusation. PA de-
cides whether to sanction the owner or not after evaluating these evidences.
The previous scheme is composed of Entrance/Departure LEZ, Payment
and Sanction protocols. These three protocols, which are related to each
other, are detailed in sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. In the tables 4.3 and 4.3, the
notation used and the proofs generated, respectively, in these protocols are
presented.
4.4 Entrance/Departure LEZ Protocol
In this section, the main phases of the Entrance/Departure protocol, in
which the foundations for the main system lay, are detailed in the ﬁrst ﬁve
subsections. The two next subsections introduce two different improvements
of the main system and address an approach to multiple zones and residents
living inside the LEZ.
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Notation Name Description
(Pke, Ske) Asymmetric key pair, public and private,
belonging to the entity e
Ence(m) Encryption of the message m using the Ence(m) = EPke (m) = m
′
asymmetric public key Pke
Dece(m′) Decryption of the encrypted message m′ ESke (m′) = ESke (EPke (m)) = m
using the asymmetric private key Ske
m∗ Set of infomation composed of the m∗ = (m, m¯)
message and its signature
h(m) Hash image of the message m
Signe(m) Digital signature of the message m Signe(m) = ESke (h(m)) = m¯
by the entity e
Veri fe(m, m¯) Veriﬁcation of the digital signature m¯ Veri fe(m, m¯) = EPke (m¯) =
by the entity e EPke (ESke (h(m))) = h(m)?
certe Public key certiﬁcate of the Pke It includes Pke, signCAi (h(Pke|...)), etc.
of the entity e supplied by CAi
f inge Fingerprint of the public key certiﬁcate It is computed by using a Hash
Pke of the entity e function of the public key certiﬁcate
certe.ext Certiﬁcate extension ext of the public
key certiﬁcate certe
Nx Nonce X It is a random number
Table 4.2: Notation
4.4.1 Setup
The setup process works as follows:
1. PA:
• PA, which is a collegiate entity, is constituted by a set of m mem-
bers
• An asymmetric key pair (PkPA, SkPA) is securely generated by
means of a threshold scheme such as in [36]. The SkPA is divided
into m pieces or shares and is securely distributed among the m
entities.
• From a competent authorities (i.e. Police) they obtain its public
key certiﬁcate certPA, and a certiﬁcate repository of the authorities
2. SP and VCA obtain from competent authorities (i.e. city council and a
transit authority, respectively):
• An asymmetric key pair (PkSP, SkSP) and (PkVCA, SkVCA), its pub-
lic key certiﬁcate certSP and certVCA, and a certiﬁcate repository
of the authorities
The certiﬁcate chain length of VCA is 1, and 0 in the case of SP. The
period of certSP validity can correspond to the concession lifetime of
the service, without exceeding it.
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Proofs Name Content
θ Information-of-prices, which is sent θ = (prices, TS), where TS is a timestamp
from SP to all the Chps periodically
ψ Information-of-entrance, which is sent ψ = (NA, θ∗)
from Chp to V when it is detected
ωi Authentication-response-of-entrance, ωi = (θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp)
which is sent from V
to Chp when V receives a ψ
wgi Photo-warning-of-entrance, wgi =
which is sent from Chp to V (ino , plt, ts′, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯i , certVq )
in case of entrance incidence
ζi Proof-of-entrance-incidence, which ζi =
is sent from Chp to SP (ino , plt, ph, ts′, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯i , certVq )
in case of entrance incidence
γi Proof-of-entrance, which is sent from γi = (ts′, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯i , f ingVq )
V to Chp in case of right execution
ρ Information-of-payment, which is sent ρ = (ts′′, NC , acc)
from Chp to V when it is detected
ωo Authentication-response-of-departure, ωo = (ts′′, NC , ND , f ingChp)
which is sent from V
to Chp V receives a ρ
wgo Photo-warning-of-exit, wgo =
which is sent from Chp to V (ino , plt, ts′′, NC , ND , f ingChp, ω¯o , certVq )
in case of departure incidence
ζo Proof-of-departure-incidence, ζo =
which is sent from Chp to SP (ino , plt, ph, ts′′, NC , ND , f ingChp, ω¯o , certVq )
in case of departure incidence
γo Proof-of-departure, which is sent from V γo = (ts′′, NC , ND , f ingChp, ω¯o , f ingVq )
to Chp in case of right execution
ωc Authentication-response-of-change, ωc = (θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp)
which is sent from V to Chp
when V receives ψ in a change-zone
wgc Photo-warning-of-change, wgc =
which is sent from Chp to V (inc, plt, ts′, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯i , certVq )
in case of change-zone incidence
ζc Proof-of-change-incidence, ζc =
which is sent from Chp to SP in case (inc, plt, ph, ts′, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯c, certVq )
of change-zone incidence
γc Proof-of-change, γc = (θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯c, f ingVq , ts′)
which is sent from V to Chp in case
of right execution of a change-zone
ζr Proof-of-residence-incidence, ζr = (inv, γi , γo , LEZid, padding)
which is sent from SP to PA
γp Proof-of-payment, which is γp contains a re f erence (hash(γo∗))
generated and sent to V and SP
by the electronic payment system used
ζp Proof-of-veriﬁcation-incidence, ζp=(inv, γi , γo)
which is sent from SP to PA
Table 4.3: Proofs and data generated in the execution of the protocol
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3. As it is detailed in Section 3.2.1, VCA generates and associates a cer-
tiﬁcation authority VCACi for each group of users, that is, for each
element of the subset K = {C1,C2, ...,CnumK}, consiting of an asymmet-
ric key pair (PkVCACi , SkVCACi ) and CA certiﬁcate certVCACi
4. Each Chp applies the following steps:
i. Obtain a certiﬁcate repository of the authorities and entities
ii. Generate an asymmetric key pair (PkChp, SkChp)
iii. Securely obtain a public key certiﬁcate certChp from SP containing
an extension certChp.loc with its location coordinates
4.4.2 Certiﬁcation
In this phase, Vehicle Certiﬁcation Authority VCA registers a user in a group
of users (an element of the subset K) and securely installs the corresponding
Certiﬁcation Authority VCACi associated to Ci in the SE of each V, consisting
of PkVCACi , SkVCACi and certVCACi . This phase is performed from time to
time, for example, before purchasing a vehicle and/or passing the regular
technical vehicle tests. Check Section 3.2.2 for further details.
4.4.3 Certiﬁcate Generation
The SE of the V, which has a certiﬁcation entity VCACi installed, gener-
ates new credentials. The resulting credentials consist of an asymmetric key
pair (PkVq , SkVq) and a public key certiﬁcate certVq containing an extension
certVq .idS, which is the encryption of the vehicle identiﬁer Vid EncPkPA(Vid).
This phase is performed every time a V is on its way to enter a LEZ in order
to avoid linkability between its trips. For example, when the vehicle’s engine
is started up or just when the D decides enter a LEZ. Check Section 3.2.1 for
more information about this phase.
The repetitive execution of this phase can produce many asymmetric
key pairs and their public key certiﬁcates, which suppose a large amount
of data. These data, together with the proofs generated in the protocol (as
it will be seen in the following steps), have to be kept in possession of the
user with the aim of using them for defense against a fraud accusation. Due
to the limited storage capacities of the SE, the storage of all information is
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not possible in it. For this reason, it is interesting to securely store the data
of previous entrances in the OBU. This can be achieved by means of key
management custody techniques. The NIST supply the documentation “A
Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems” [38]
and “Recommendation for Key management” [39], which provide general
guidance and best practices for the management of cryptographic keying
material.
4.4.4 Check-in
When a Chp placed in the entrance of a LEZ detects a V, the following steps
are applied:
1. Chp has to:
i. Generate a nonce NA and compose a message information-of-
entrance ψ = (NA, θ∗), where θ∗ is detailed in the following Section
4.5.1
ii. Sign ψ: SignChp(ψ) = ψ¯, and send ψ∗ and its certChp to V
2. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Verify the certiﬁcate certChp and the signature ψ¯: Veri fChp(NA, θ∗,
ψ¯)
ii. Verify the signature θ¯: Veri fSP(prices, TS, θ¯) and the location coor-
dinates certChp.loc of Chp
iii. Verify the freshness of TS:|TS-current time| < δ, where δ is a ﬁxed
time
iv. Generate a nonce NB and compute the ﬁngerprint f ingChp of
certChp (it is computed as the hash function of the certiﬁcate and it
is used as an identiﬁer)
v. Compose a message authentication-response-of-entrance ωi =
(θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp)
vi. Sign ωi: SignVq(ωi) = ω¯i, and send NB, ω¯i and its certVq to Chp
3. Chp has to:
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i. Obtain a time ts, and verify the certiﬁcate certVq and the signature
ω¯i: Veri fVq(θ
∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯i)
ii. If one of the veriﬁcations fails:
ii.i Generate an incidence number of entrance ini
ii.ii Take a photograph ph of V and extract the plate number plt
ii.iii Compose photo-warning-of-entrance wgi= (ini, plt, ts, θ∗, NA,
NB, f ingChp, ω¯i, certVq)
ii.iv Sign wgi: SignChp(wgi) = w¯gi, and send ini, plt, ts and w¯gi
to the V
ii.v Compose a message proof-of-entrance-incidence ζi= (ini, plt,
ph, ts, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯i, certVq)
ii.vi Sign ζi: SignChp(ζi) = ζ¯i, and send ζi∗ to SP
iii. If the veriﬁcations performed in 3i) are correct:
iii.i Compute the f ingVq of certVq and compose a message proof-
of-entrance γi=(ts, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯i, f ingVq)
iii.ii Sign γi: SignChp(γi) = γ¯i and send ts and γ¯i to the V
4. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, analyses the received mes-
sage:
i. If the content of the message corresponds to the data sent in step
3(ii)iv:
i.i. Verify the signature w¯gi: Veri fChp(ini, plt, ts, θ∗, NA, NB,
f ingChp, ω¯i, certVq , w¯gi)
i.ii. Verify the freshness of ts:|ts-current time| < δ′, where δ′ is a
ﬁxed time
i.iii. Store wgi∗
ii. If the content of the message corresponds to the data sent in step
3(iii)ii:
ii.i. Verify the signature γ¯i: Veri fChp(θ∗, NA, NB,
f ingChp, ω¯i, f ingVq , ts, γ¯i)
ii.ii. Verify the freshness of ts:|ts-current time| < δ′, where δ′ is a
ﬁxed time
ii.iii. Store γ∗i
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Figure 4.2: Check-in communication
The ﬁgure 4.2 shows the messages exchanged between V and Chp in the
Check-in phase.
4.4.5 Check-out
When a Chp placed in the exit of a LEZ detects a V, the following steps are
applied:
1. Chp has to:
i. Obtain a time ts′ and a nonce NC, and compose a message
information-of-payment ρ = (ts′, NC, acc), where acc identiﬁes the
target account, of the electronic payment system assumed, of SP
ii. Sign ρ: SignChp(ρ) = ρ¯, and send ρ∗ and its certChp to V
2. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Verify the certiﬁcate certChp, the signature ρ¯: Veri fChp(ts′, NC, acc,
ρ¯), the location coordinates certChp.loc of Chp and the freshness of
ts′:|ts′−current time| < δ′, where δ′ is a ﬁxed time
ii. Generate a nonce ND and compute the ﬁngerprint f ingChp of
certChp
iii. Compose a message authentication-response-of-departure ωo =
(ts′, NC, ND, f ingChp)
iv. Sign ωo: SignVq(ωo) = ω¯o, and send ND, ω¯o and its certVq to Chp
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3. Chp has to:
i. Verify the certiﬁcate certVq and the signature ω¯o: Veri fVq(ts
′, NC,
ND, f ingChp, ω¯o)
ii. If one of the veriﬁcations fails:
ii.i Generate an incidence number of departure ino
ii.ii Take a photograph ph of the V and extract the number plate
plt
ii.iii Compose a message photo-warning-of-exit wgo= (ino, plt, ts′,
NC, ND, f ingChp, ω¯o, certVq)
ii.iv Sign wgo: SignChp(wgo) = ¯wgo, and send ino, plt, and ¯wgo to
the V
ii.v Compose a message proof-of-departure-incidence ζo=(ino, plt,
ph, ts′, NC, ND, f ingChp, ω¯o, certVq)
ii.vi Sign ζo: SignChp(ζo) = ζ¯o, and send ζo∗ to SP
iii. If the veriﬁcations performed in 3i) are correct:
iii.i Compute the f ingVq of certVq , and compose a message proof-
of-departure γo = (ts′, NC, ND, f ingChp, ω¯o, f ingVq)
iii.ii Sign γo, SignChp(γo)=γ¯o, and send it to the V
4. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, analyses the received mes-
sage:
i. If the content of the message corresponds to the data sent in step
3(ii)iv:
i.i. Verify the signature ¯wgo: Veri fChp(ino, plt, ts′, NC, ND,
f ingChp, ω¯o, certVq , ¯wgo)
i.ii. Store wgo∗
ii. If the content of the message corresponds to the data sent in step
3(iii)ii:
ii.i. Verify the signature γ¯o: Veri fChp(ts′, NC, ND, f ingChp, ω¯o,
f ingVq , γ¯o)
ii.ii. Store γ∗o
The ﬁgure 4.3 shows the messages exchanged between V and Chp in the
Check-out phase.
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Figure 4.3: Check-out communication
4.4.6 Extending the Protocol: Multiple Zones
In some cases, a LEZ could be designed, with a set of adjacent or nested sub-
zones LEZz, where z = [1, 2, ..., n] (according to a set of factors such as the
trafﬁc congestion or the contamination level). Each LEZz can be associated
with different prices according the trafﬁc restrictions1.
The main idea of the system presented above could be approached in
the same way to achieve a fair multiple LEZ keeping a high level of user
privacy. When a V moves from one zone/sub-zone to another one, it can
be understood as a change of zone. In order to control this change, new
Chps are placed just in the border of the LEZz, speciﬁcally, in the streets that
interconnect booth zones. When a V goes through one of these Chps, the Chp
records both the exit from the old zone and the entrance to the new zone,
in a same proof-of-change γc. Therefore, several signed proofs γ∗c , γ∗c
′, γ∗c
′′,
etc., as many as change of zones exist, are generated together with γ∗i and
γ∗o . An example of multiple LEZ composed of two zones, which are nested
in each other, can be observed in ﬁgure 4.4.
The following steps, which manage the change-zone of a V by Chps, are
strongly based on the check-in phase (see Section 4.4.4 for further details).
Therefore, when a Chp placed in a change-zone detects a V, the following
steps are applied:
1. Chp composes a message information-of-entrance ψ = (NA, θ∗), signs ψ
1http://urbanaccessregulations.eu/
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Figure 4.4: Example of multiple LEZ composed of 2 zones
and sends (ψ, ψ¯, certChp) to the V. Note that the information-of-entrance
proof ψ refers to the entrance to the new zone. In the same way, the
prices θ∗ contained in ψ belong to the new zone
2. the SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Verify certChp, ψ¯, θ¯, certChp.loc and ts
ii. Compose a message authentication-response-of-change ωc =
(θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp), sign ωc, and send (NB, ω¯c, certVq) to
Chp
3. Chp has to:
i. Verify certVq and ω¯c
ii. If one of the veriﬁcations fails, Chp performs the following opera-
tions:
ii.i Take a photograph ph of V and extract the plate number plt
ii.ii Compose a message photo-warning-of-change wgc=(inc, plt, ts,
θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯i, certVq), sign wgc, and send (inc, plt,
ts, ¯wgc) to V
ii.iii Compose a message proof-of-incidence-change ζc= (inc, plt, ph,
ts, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp, ω¯c, certVq), sign ζc, and send ζc
∗ to
SP
iii. If the veriﬁcations performed are correct, Chp has to:
iii.i Compose a message proof-of-change γc=(θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp,
ω¯c, f ingVq , ts), sign γc, and send (ts, γ¯c) to the V
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4. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, analyses the received mes-
sage:
i. If the content of the message corresponds to the data sent in step
3(ii)ii, it veriﬁes ¯wgc and ts, and stores wgi∗ = (w¯gi, w¯gi)
ii. If the content of the message corresponds to the data sent in step
3(iii)i, it veriﬁes γ¯c and the freshness of ts, and stores γ∗c
4.4.7 Extending the Protocol: Addressing Residents
People or local residents living in a LEZ could be discriminated by the ap-
plication of a LEZ in their streets. These people should not have to pay to
get to their homes as much as non-residents driving through a LEZ. For this
reason, the use of a LEZ that does not discriminate residents would be an
interesting idea.
This preferential treatment to residents is not new. In other contexts such
as disc parking2 or blue zones, local people can park for free or pay less, for
example, with the use of resident cards. In this way, people have to accredit
their vehicles in order to make use of the LEZ with a preferential treatment.
To do that, residents have to prove that their domicile and the ﬁscal domicile
of their vehicles are the same and belongs to the LEZ.
The Entrance/Departure LEZ protocol proposed above can be improved by
addressing resident Vs. First of all, when a V is certiﬁed (Section 4.4.2), it
is initialized with a LEZ identiﬁer LEZid, which belongs to the LEZ where
it is accredited. In case V is not considered resident, the protocol keeps
unchanged.
Subsequently, an extension CertVq .res to the CertVq is added in step 2 of
Section 3.2.3, where the SE of a V generates a public key certiﬁcate CertVq
every time the V is on its way to enter the LEZ. This extension contains the
probabilistic encryption by using OAEP padding of the LEZ identiﬁer LEZid
with the public key of SP: CertVq .res = EncPkSP(LEZid, padding).
After a V has been left the LEZ, the SP can verify whether a V is con-
sidered resident of its own zone because the CertVq used in the check-in and
check-out phase will include CertVq .res. In the case of a V resident considered
2http://www.dublincity.ie/main-menu-services-roads-and-traffic-parking-dublin/
parking-city-residents
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in a LEZ, a SP could verify it only if the SP is the one who offers the service
of the concerned LEZ. Then, the SP will be able to check it by decrypting
CertVq .res with the use of its private key: DecSkSP(CertVq) = (LEZid, padding).
In a multiple LEZ, the LEZ identiﬁer LEZid could be replaced by a LEZz
identiﬁer. In this way, a V considered a resident will have a preferential
treatment if in its trajectory it goes through its LEZz. In this case, the SP
should verify that at least one of the proofs γ∗i , γ
∗
c , ..., γ∗o is associated to the
LEZid.
4.5 Payment Protocol
This section describes the part of the system related to the toll payment.
This protocol requires the steps of the previous section, which lays the foun-
dations of the system. The payment protocol is described in the ﬁrst three
subsections: price generation, payment and payment veriﬁcation steps. Two dif-
ferent improvements are introduced in the two last subsections by modifying
the payment protocol (Multiple zones and residents).
4.5.1 Price Generation
Whenever SP wants to modify the fees of a LEZ, it performs the following
operations:
1. Set the prices per unit of time and emission category (i.e. European
Emission Standards) and obtain a timestamp TS
2. Compose a message information-of-prices θ = (prices, TS)
3. Sign θ (SignSP(θ) = θ¯) and send θ∗ to each Chp
4.5.2 Payment
After a V leaves the LEZ, regardless of the electronic payment system used,
the payment is made by performing the following operations:
1. Recover ts and ts′ from a pair of γi, γo
2. Compute the length of stay τ a LEZ: (ts′-ts)=τ
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3. Recover the prices included in θ∗ of γi, and compute the amount of
money required to pay according to τ, its pollutant emissions and the
prices
4. Compute the reference, which will link the transaction and a trip in
LEZ, as the hash function of γo∗: re f erence = hash(γo∗)
5. Make a payment of the amount of money, which contains the reference
in the transfer subject, to the target account acc. As a result, a proof-
of-payment γp containing the reference is obtained from the electronic
payment system used.
The payment of a LEZ trip can be made by anyone. The payer could be
the same D, a passenger or even a business. To do that, the payment proof,
regardless of the electronic payment system used, have to include a reference.
Therefore, the payer, in order to be able to perform the operations detailed
above, should know the set of γi, γo proofs and their certVq associated. A
good way to securely share this information between owners and payers
could be by using an outsourced data protection system in the Cloud with
access control based on roles such as in [40].
4.5.3 Payment Veriﬁcation
Each Chp periodically (i.e. every day) sends SP the different proofs γi, γo
and ζs (ζi and ζo), which are generated in phases 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 of the
protocol. SP stores all these information in a data base and then, forwards
the incidences ζi and ζo to PA. Moreover, SP obtains a set γp from electronic
payment system used. Then, SP performs the following operations every
payment veriﬁcation period (in batch), for example every month, for each set
of proofs γi and γo associated to the same f ingVq :
1. Extract ts, ts′, and certVq .em from γi and γo
2. Extract prices from θ∗, included in γi
3. Compute the length of stay τ a LEZ: (ts′-ts)=τ
4. Compute the amount′ of money required to pay according to τ,
certVq .em and the prices
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5. Compute the re f erence′ as the hash function of γo∗: hash(γo∗)
6. Search and verify whether there is a single proof-of-payment γp with
the same reference (re f erence′ = re f erence).
7. Verify whether the transfer was successful and recover the amount of
money paid
8. Verify whether amount = amount′
9. If one of the veriﬁcations fails then,
i. Generate an incidence number of veriﬁcation inv
ii. Compose a message proof-of-veriﬁcation incidence ζp including γi
and γo of Vq: ζp=(inv, γi, γo, γp)
iii. Sign ζp (SignSP(ζp) = ζ¯p) and send ζp∗ to PA
4.5.4 Extending the Protocol: Multiple Zones
As it was stated in the previous section, when a V moves from a zone/sub-
zone to another LEZz, it can be understood as a change of zone. In each
change-zone, a time is generated (ts′′, ts′′′, ts′′′′, etc., which are included in
each proof-of-change γ∗c , γ∗c
′, γ∗c
′′, etc.) for each stretch.
After the V leaves deﬁnitively a Multiple LEZ, a set of γi, γ∗c , γ∗c
′, γ∗c
′′, etc.
and γo associated to the same V by its f ingVq are generated.
Therefore, the payment phase, which is based on the single LEZ payment
described above (Sec. 4.5.2) where anyone can pay for a trip in the multiple
LEZ), is modiﬁed taking into account the proofs previously mentioned (like
in Section 4.5.2):
1. Compute the length of stay for each stretch sub-zone: τ = ts′ − ts,
τ′′ = ts′′ − ts′, τ′′′ = ts′′′ − ts′′, etc.
2. Compute and accumulate the amount of money required to pay in each
stretch according to the several τ, its pollutant emissions and the prices,
which are ﬁxed each time the V enters or changes a zone.
3. Compute the reference as the hash function of γo∗: hash(γo∗)
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4. Make a payment of the amount of money, which contains the reference
in the transfer subject, to the target account acc.
In the same way, the payment veriﬁcation phase, which is based on the
previous phase of payment veriﬁcation (See Sec. 4.5.3 for more details), is
modiﬁed. Therefore, the SP performs the following operations:
1. Extract ts, ts′, ts′′, ts′′′, etc. from γi,γ∗c , γ∗c
′, γ∗c
′′, etc. and γo
2. Extract the different prices from θ∗, θ∗′, θ∗′′, etc.
3. Compute the length of stay for each stretch sub-zone: τ = ts′ − ts,
τ′′ = ts′′ − ts′, τ′′′ = ts′′′ − ts′′, etc.
4. Compute and accumulate the amount of money required to pay in
each stretch, according to the several τ, its pollutant emissions and the
prices, which are ﬁxed each time the V enters or changes a zone
5. Compute the re f erence′
6. Search and verify whether there is a single proof-of-payment γp with
the same reference (re f erence′ = re f erence)
7. Verify whether the transfer was successful and whether amount =
amount′
8. If one of the veriﬁcations fails, it composes a message proof-of-
veriﬁcation-incidence ζp = (inv, γi,γ∗c , γ∗c
′, γ∗c
′′, ..., γo, γp), signs ζp and
sends ζp∗ to PA
4.5.5 Extending the Protocol: Addressing Residents
The protocol, detailed in Section 4.4.7, already provides a vehicle qualiﬁca-
tion as resident and non-resident condition, and its detection. The system,
in order to give a preferential treatment to residents by means of a special
economic approach, has to provide a payment protocol applying a discount
on the prices of the LEZ.
In such way, a resident V has to apply the discount to the amount value
(at the time of the calculation of the payment and after step 4.5-3)): discount:
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amount = amount− (amount ∗ discount); and then, make the transfer of the
new amount.
Since the SP is able to detect whether a V is considered resident of a LEZ
(detailed in Section 4.4.7), four cases can take place:
• SP detects a V considered resident and veriﬁes that the fees are cor-
rectly paid as a resident.
• SP detects a V considered non-resident and veriﬁes that the fees are
correctly paid as a non-resident.
• SP detects a V considered resident and veriﬁes that the fees are incor-
rectly paid as a non-resident.
• SP detects a V considered non-resident and veriﬁes that the fees are
incorrectly paid as a resident.
In the case of a resident detection, the SP veriﬁes whether vehicles have
paid correctly according to their resident condition, after step 4.5-5), apply-
ing the discount to amount′ value in a similar way as the above mentioned:
amount′ = amount′ − (amount′ ∗ discount).
If the payment is incorrectly paid as a resident when it is not a resident,
just as in the last case, the SP has to:
1. Generate an incidence number of veriﬁcation inv
2. Compose a message proof-of-residence-incidence ζr including γi, γo,
padding and LEZid of the Vq: ζr=(inv, γi, γo, LEZid, padding).
3. Sign ζr (SignSP(ζr) = ζ¯r) and send ζr∗ to PA
4.6 Sanction Protocol
This section makes the entire system take shape in combination with the
other two protocols. The ﬁrst subsection describes the sanction process. The
two next subsections make reference to the modiﬁcations of the sanction
process to approach the system to multiple zones and resident extensions.
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4.6.1 Sanction
PA, as the entity responsible for auditing and penalizing irregularities in the
execution of the protocol and potential frauds, receives a set of incidences
proofs from SP every sanction period (i.e. 15 days from the payment veriﬁca-
tion period). Depending on the type of proof, the sanction process is carried
out as follows:
1. In the case of ζi or ζo:
i. The m sub-entities of PA perform the following operations:
i.i. Verify the signature ζ∗ and the signatures included in ζ,
and extract the number plate plt from the photograph ph,
included in ζ
i.ii. Contact the owner of the V using plt, inform her about the
sanctioning procedure and require evidences of the contrary
to refute the accusation
2. In the case of ζp:
i. The m sub-entities of PA perform the following operations:
i.i. Verify all the signatures included in ζp and verify that the
signatory of γi and γo is the same
i.ii. Verify the right payment by repeating steps 1-8 from 4.5.3
i.iii. If the incidence is conﬁrmed by a least t from m members
of PA, the f ingVq of certVq is then made public, for example,
in a Bulletin Board, which is widely used in many countries
such as the “Tablo´n Edictal de Sanciones de Tra´ﬁco” of the
Spanish Ministry of Internal Affairs3. In a private zone of the
Bulletin Board, the proofs presented by the SP are uploaded
ii. The owner of the V performs the following operations:
ii.i. Look for ﬁngerprints f ingVq of her CertVq in the Bulletin
Board every certain period of time
3https://sede.dgt.gob.es/es/tramites-y-multas/alguna-multa/
consulta-tablon-edictal-testra/
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ii.ii. If f ingVq is not found, all the information generated by sys-
tem and stored in the OBU, which are associated to the same
CertVq , are deleted
ii.iii. If f ingVq is found, then:
ii.iii.i. Obtain more information of the sanction process,
through the authentication of her certVq , if one of
her ﬁngerprints is found on the Bulletin Board, and
get access to the private zone of the Bulletin Board
ii.iii.ii. After evaluating the proofs of her accusation, she
could present evidences to PA in order to refute her
accusation
iii. The m sub-entities of PA have to:
iii.i. Verify the evidences presented by the owner of the V to
refute the accusation
iii.ii. The SkPA is reconstructed from their own shares if the pre-
sented contra evidences are not considered valid by at least
t from m members of PA. Therefore, the identiﬁer Vid of Vq
is recovered by opening the extension certVq.idS of the cer-
tiﬁcate certVq, included in the proof γi or γo. Finally, the
owner of V is ﬁned according to the type of infraction
4.6.2 Extending the Protocol: Multiple Zones
PA receives a set of incidences proofs from SP as in the previous subsection.
Apart from that, considering a multiple LEZ, PA can also receive proof-of-
incidence change ζc. In spite of this difference, the sanction process is similar
to the process described above. Depending on the type of incidence, the
sanction process is carried out as follows:
1. In the case of ζi, ζo or ζc, the m sub-entities of PA verify ζ∗ and the
included signatures, recover plt from ph, and request evidences by the
owner of the V to refute the sanctioning procedure
2. In the case of ζp:
i. The m sub-entities of PA performs the following operations:
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i.i. Verify all the signatures included in ζp and verify that the
signatory of γi,γ∗c , γ∗c
′, γ∗c
′′, etc. and γo, is the same
i.ii. Verify the right payment by repeating steps 1-7 from 4.5.4
i.iii. If the incidence is conﬁrmed by a least t from m members
of PA, the f ingVq of certVq is then made public. In a private
zone of the Bulletin Board, the proofs presented by the SP are
uploaded
ii. The owner of the V looks for her CertVq in the Bulletin Board. If she
ﬁnds it, she then gets more information through the private zone
of the Bulletin Board. After evaluating the proofs of her accusation,
she could present evidences to refute PA’s accusation
iii. The m sub-entities of PA verify the evidences presented by V. If
they are not considered valid by at least t from m members of PA,
the SkPA is reconstructed. Therefore, the identiﬁer Vid is recovered.
Finally, the owner of V is ﬁned
4.6.3 Extending the Protocol: Addressing Residents
The PA can receives incidences ζr, which are related to a misuse of resident
condition, from SP. In this case, the ζr incidence proof is dealt by PA as
a proof-of-veriﬁcation incidence ζp and thus, it is processed in step 4.6.1-2).
Due to this protocol extension, the basic protocol described in 4.6.1 has to
be modiﬁed. In particular, step 4.6.1-2ii), which are performed by the m
sub-entities of PA, are changed by the following ones:
i.i. Verify all the signatures included in ζp and verify that the signatory of
γi and γo is the same
i.ii. Recover CertVq .res from CertVq
i.iii. Compute CertVq .res
′ using LEZid and padding included in ζr: CertVq .res′
= EncPkSP(LEZid, padding)
i.iv. Verify CertVq .res = CertVq .res
′
i.v. Verify the right payment by repeating steps 1 to 8 from 4.5.3. Note that
a discount has to be applied to the amount when the resident condition
is conﬁrmed, such as in Section 4.5.5
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
4.7. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS 51
i.vi. If the incidence is conﬁrmed by a least t from m members of PA, the
f ingVq of certVq is then made public, for example in a Bulletin Board,
which is widely used in many countries. In a private zone of the Bul-
letin Board, the proofs presented by the SP are uploaded
The remaining steps of the basic protocol keep unaltered.
4.7 Security and Privacy Analysis
The security and privacy requirements of this system are studied in this sec-
tion. The discussion is organized in three propositions, and each proposition
can have several claims to support its fulﬁllment.
Proposition 4.7.0.1 The proposed system preserves authenticity, non-repudiation
and integrity for the entrance and departure proofs.
Claim 1. The creation of fraudulent entrance and departure proofs is computa-
tionally unfeasible nowadays.
Proof. Entrance proofs have the following form γi=(ts, θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp,
ω¯i, f ingVq). The checkpoint signs entrance proofs γi: SignChp(γi) = γ¯i
and sends the pair ts and γ¯i to vehicles. In the same way, departure
proofs γo = (ts′, NC, ND, f ingChp, ω¯o, f ingVq) are signed by the checkpoint,
SignChp(γo)=γ¯o, and sent it to vehicles. For these reasons, the generation
of entrance and departure proofs is nowadays computationally unfeasible,
without the knowledge of the secret key used by Chp in the signature. 
Claim 2. Chps, which are issuers of the entrance and departure proofs, can not
deny the emission of these proofs.
Proof. Entrance and departure proofs are generated and signed by their
issuer (Chps) and, considering the signature scheme secure, this operation
can be only performed by these issuers. Thus, the issuer’s identity is linked
to the proofs and, for the properties of the electronic signature scheme, it
can not deny its authorship. 
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Claim 3. The content of the entrance and departure proofs can not be modiﬁed
by the vehicles.
Proof. If we suppose that the signature scheme is secure and that the hash
summary function is collision-resistant, if the content of the entrance or
departure proofs was modiﬁed, the veriﬁcation of the signature would
be incorrect because Signe(m) = ESke(h(m)) = m¯. In order to pass the
veriﬁcation, the signature would be regenerated from the new entrance
or exit ticket. This operation is computationally unfeasible without the
knowledge of the checkpoint secret key. 
Result 1 According to the presented proofs in Claims 1, 2 and 3, it can be assured
that the protocol satisﬁes the needed security requirements (authenticity, integrity
and non-repudiation) for the proofs to be considered valid.
Proposition 4.7.0.2 The system presented here preserves the privacy of its users
and protects their anonymity, avoiding the traceability of their actions.
Claim 4. The system guarantees the anonymity of honest users.
Proof. The information that the user transmits to enter the system is the
authentication-response-of-entrance ωi = (θ∗, NA, NB, f ingChp) and its signature.
The Chp will verify the signature using the certiﬁcate certVq accompanying
the user message. This certiﬁcate (generated by the SE of the V before en-
tering the LEZ) identiﬁes the vehicle, but the identiﬁcation information is
protected with an asymmetric encryption, using the public key of PA. Thus,
Chp can verify the signature but it is not able to identify the vehicle. Then,
Chp generates and transmits to the user γ¯i. With this evidence, the vehicle
may enter the LEZ. The information related to the user identiﬁcation inside
γ¯i is the same included in ωi. This means that the V enters the LEZ without
being identiﬁed.
When V leaves the LEZ, the user must send the authentication-response-of-
departure ωo = (ts′, NC, ND, f ingChp) to the Chp. It is not possible to identify
the user through the signature on ωo by the reasons explained in the
previous paragraph. Consequently, the entrance a LEZ and the departure
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from a LEZ of honest users are anonymous. 
Claim 5. The protocol does not allow to trace or to link the actions of the
vehicles.
Proof. It is not possible to associate the various entries and departures from
a LEZ of the same vehicle if we use the information generated by the execu-
tion of the protocol. This happens because the steps described in 3.2.3 are
executed each time the V approaches a LEZ. This means that the SE gener-
ates a new certVq for the vehicle in each new entrance process. This certiﬁcate
is the only element that could identify the V. However, considering that the
use of the certiﬁcate is unique for each entrance/departure process, nobody
can relate the identity of V of this entrance/departure process with any other
entrance/departure process.
The information that could be repeated in other entrance/departure
process of the same V is the certVq.idS ﬁeld. But, as it is speciﬁed in the
protocol, certVq.idS is computed with a probabilistic encryption, using for
example the OAEP padding system, which means that the result of each
new encryption credentials is different. 
Result 2 The system presented here preserves the privacy in accordance with
claims 4 and 5: users can use the system anonymously and each new usage can not
be related to any other with respect to the identity of the vehicles.
Proposition 4.7.0.3 The system has anti-fraud requirements concerning the cor-
rectness and veriﬁability of the evidences generated in the protocol.
Claim 6. The system can identify dishonest users thanks to the anonymity
revocation property of the protocol.
Proof. If users do not properly perform the authentication at the en-
trance/departure process of the system, then they can lose the anonymity
because the Chp takes a picture of the V capturing the number plate. This
information is sent to PA to act as it is speciﬁed in the Sanction protocol. In
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the execution of this protocol, PA has the ability to identify the user through
the number plate.
If users have not made the proper payment, then SP veriﬁes in the
Payment Veriﬁcation phase that the amount paid corresponds to the tax de-
termined for τ and emissions of V. If the veriﬁcation fails, this information
is sent to PA to issue a trafﬁc ﬁne for the user. PA veriﬁes the incidence and
identiﬁes the user by opening the ﬁeld certVq.idS of the certiﬁcate with its
private key. Obtaining Vid allows the identiﬁcation and the punishment of
the dishonest user. 
Claim 7. The protocol execution generates evidences for an honest user (they
are saved in the OBU) to prove or disprove the allegations of fraud.
Proof. When a user is accused of not performing the authentication correctly,
a ζi or a ζo that records the incidence is generated. The user can be accused of
using an improper certiﬁcate certVq or sending an incorrect signature ω¯i/ω¯o.
In both cases, PA contacts her during the Sanction process, so she can provide
evidences to rebut the charges.
An honest user can retrieve a valid certVq , from her OBU, which matches
her vehicle (identiﬁed by the number plate) or a signature ω¯i/ω¯o that was
successfully computed by the SE with the help of the OBU during the en-
trance/departure process of the LEZ.
In case of a payment incidence, the user has to demonstrate that the
payment has been made according to the data stored in γo∗ and γp∗ (both
items signed by the Chp). Therefore, an honest user will be able to retrieve
this information from her OBU and send it to PA to refute the accusation. 
Result 3 The system keeps fraud under control and it can identify dishonest users.
These users receive the appropriate trafﬁc ﬁne. The protocol also allows honest users
to get evidences of their correct performance. The evidences are used to rebut any
trafﬁc ﬁne due to some kind of malfunction of the system’s actors.
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4.8 Functional Requirements Analysis
This section presents a feasibility study of the application of the proposed
system in the real world. This study is divided into two different parts,
the online-feasibility study and the Electronic Payment System Adaption study,
according to the steps of the protocol that are evaluated.
The ﬁrst one, the online-feasibility study, aims to evaluate the most critic
part of the system and to demonstrate that its execution is possible nowa-
days. This study involves sections 4.4.3, 4.4.4 and 4.4.5, which have hard
temporary restrictions since communication between the entities is made in
movement. In particular, Vs, which keep moving while entering or leaving
the LEZ, and Chps, have to be able to properly perform each step of these
phases with sufﬁcient time to transmit and receive the expected set of proofs
and data (such as certiﬁcates, proofs-of-entrance or proofs-of-departure).
The second study, the Electronic Payment System Adaption study, attempts
to evaluate whether the existing electronic payment systems accomplish the
restriction of anonymity and untraceability, which were stated in Section
4.2. This study also considers some current electronic payment systems to
be adapted in the proposed system.
4.8.1 Online-feasibility Study
This study assesses the feasibility of the practical deployment of some parts
of the system. In particular, it focuses on the parts of the system that have
high temporary restrictions since the information transmitted between some
entities is in movement. This study thus evaluates whether the execution of
those parts can be performed quickly enough to have time to transmit and
receive the required information in movement. The parts of the protocol
with high temporary restrictions are the Certiﬁcate Generation phase (Section
4.4.3), the Check-in phase (Section 4.4.4) and the Check-out phase (Section
4.4.5). In the two last phases, Vs and Chps execute the protocol and com-
municate between them while the ﬁrst ones pass through the second ones at
the entrance/departure of a LEZ. In particular, Vs, OBUs, SEs, and Chps are
involved.
The following development environment and hardware have been used
in this study:
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• Mobile Security Card SE 1.04: This is a Java Card in microSD format,
which provides security capabilities for smart phones. Speciﬁcally, it
uses version 5.0 of the Sm@artCafe´ Expert’s operating system. This
device has been used as the SE in the simulation because it is a cheap
tamper-proof device with cryptographic capabilities.
• Samsung Galaxy S3: This smart phone, which uses the Android 4.1.2
version, has been used as an OBU. This device has a CPU Quad-core
1.4 GHz Cortex-A9 and 1 GB RAM. In addition, it has a microSD card
slot, which jointly with Android OS, they make communication be-
tween smart phones and Mobile Security Card possible. The library
Spongy Castle, which is a library for Android platform containing the
last version of the cryptographic library Bouncy Castle, is used to per-
form the less sensitive cryptographic operations out of the SE, such
as signature and certiﬁcate veriﬁcations. This device plays the role of
OBU in the simulation.
• PC: It is a common personal computer with a CPU of 2 i7-cores of
2,3 Ghz and 1 GB RAM. The used OS is a 64 bit Ubuntu 14.04. This
device will perform the operation of the Chp in the simulation. These
operations have been developed using the Java language and the cryp-
tographic operations have been computed using the last version of
Bouncy Castle, which is a Java library.
The study consists in obtaining the performance cost of the system exe-
cution and in evaluating whether this cost is low enough to make commu-
nication in movement possible using an affordable hardware and easier to
ﬁnd in the market.
Concerning the technology used to communicate between Vs and Chps,
ZigBee technology is considered. In particular the cost of this communica-
tion has been estimated from [41], which uses an implementation of Zig-
Bee named XBee5 and which takes into account the Doppler effect on the
communication in movement. The results obtained in [41] prove that the
communication in movement between a vehicle at 60km/h and a ﬁxed point
4http://www.gi-de.com/gd_media/media/press/prs_1/pdf/PM_MicroSD_Card_SE_10_
final_E.pdf
5http://www.digi.com/lp/xbee/
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with a low number of erroneous packets is possible. In detail, 2000 pack-
ets can be correctly received, and even more if the velocity of the vehicle is
lower. These 2000 packets can be transmitted from 250m of distance, which
means that approximately 133 packets per second can be transmitted along
it, and that each packet can be ﬁtted with 100 bytes of data.
In view of the aforementioned situation, the total temporal cost has been
calculated by implementing the steps of the protocols and by estimating the
communication cost. The computational costs were gathered by averaging
the single processes over 100 iterations. The details of the implementation
and the performance results obtained in each phase are detailed below:
1. Certiﬁcate Generation (Section 3.2.3): The generation of an entity cer-
tiﬁcate every time a V is on its way to enter a LEZ is implemented. It
consists in ﬁrst generating a RSA key pair (PkVq ,SkVq) of 2048 bits in
the Mobile Security Card, and then the public key certiﬁcate certVq fol-
lowing the features described in step 2 (such as the extension contain-
ing the encrypted Vid with the public key of PA). All these have been
achieved thanks to the installation of VCACi certiﬁcation entity in the
Mobile Security Card. The temporal cost of certiﬁcate generation in the
Mobile Security Card, which follows the features described in the pro-
tocol, is 10,350s, and the size of the generated certiﬁcate stored in the
smart phone memory is 1574 bytes. Note that the temporal cost covers
the key pair generation, the certiﬁcate generation and the extraction of
it outside the SE.
2. Check-in (Section 4.4.4): The cost related to the interaction between Vs
and Chps to get access to the LEZ is simulated here. The temporal cost
of this phase, which is separated according to the computation and
communication costs, is detailed below for each step. In addition, the
size of the transmitted information is also detailed.
• Step 1: Total = 0,228s.
– Computational cost: 0,020s.
– Communication cost: 0,208s (3186 bytes = 32 data packets).
• Step 2: Total = 1,782s.
– Computational cost: 1,542s.
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– Communication cost: 0,240s (3686 bytes = 37 data packets).
• Step 3: According to the results of the veriﬁcations performed in
this step, some of the following sub-steps will be either performed
or not. If the veriﬁcations are correctly performed (step 1 and 3),
Total = 0,198s. Otherwise (step 1 and 2), Total = 0,384s. The detail
of the sub-steps is as follows:
– Step 3i: 0,011s.
∗ Computational cost: 0,011s.
∗ Communication cost: None.
– Step 3ii: Total = 0,373s. Note that the time required to obtain
the license plate of the V from the camera is taken from [42].
∗ Computational cost: 0,023s.
∗ License recognition cost: 0,175s.
∗ Communication cost: 0,175s (2603 bytes = 27 data pack-
ets).
– Step 3iii: Total = 0,187s.
∗ Computational cost: 0,018s.
∗ Communication cost: 0,169s (2582 bytes = 26 data pack-
ets).
• Step 4i: Total = 0,005s. Note that this step will be performed if the
veriﬁcations performed in 3i fail.
– Computational cost: 0,005s.
– Communication cost: None.
• Step 4ii: Total = 0,005s. Note that this step will be performed if
the veriﬁcations performed in 3i are correct.
– Computational cost: 0,005s.
– Communication cost: None.
Supposing that the execution of the protocol is performed correctly,
when an incidence has not been generated, that is, the veriﬁcations
performed in 3i are correct, the total temporal cost is 2,213s. On the
contrary, if an incidence has been generated, that is, one of the veriﬁ-
cations performed in 3i fails, then the temporal cost is 2,400s.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
4.8. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 59
Therefore, both results are fast enough in order for them to have time
to communicate in movement. The temporal length of communication
window, in which both entities are able to transmit information at 60
km/h along 250m of distance, is 15s. There is therefore a high margin
between 2,400s and 15s, and even more if the velocity of the vehicle is
lower.
3. Check-out (Section 4.4.5): The cost related to the interaction between
Vs and Chps to leave the LEZ is simulated below. As in the previous
phase of the protocol, the temporal cost of this phase, considering the
computation and communication costs, is detailed for each step jointly
with the size of the transmitted information.
• Step 1: Total = 0,126s.
– Computational cost: 0,009s.
– Communication cost: 0,117s (1793 bytes = 18 data packets).
• Step 2: Total = 1,499s.
– Computational cost: 1,317s.
– Communication cost: 0,182s (2768 bytes = 28 data packets).
• Step 3: According to the results of the veriﬁcations performed in
this step, some of the following sub-steps will be either performed
or not. If the veriﬁcations are correctly performed (step 1 and 3),
Total = 0,036s. Otherwise (step 1 and 2), Total = 0,255s. The detail
of the step is divided into the following sub-steps:
– Step 3i: 0,004s.
∗ Computational cost: 0,004s.
∗ Communication cost: None.
– Step 3ii: Total = 0,251s. The time required to obtain the license
plate of the V from the camera is taken from [42], like in the
previous phase.
∗ Computational cost: 0,011s.
∗ License recognition cost: 0,175s.
∗ Communication cost: 0,065s (929 bytes = 10 data packets).
– Step 3iii: Total = 0,032s.
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∗ Computational cost: 0,013s.
∗ Communication cost: 0,019s (267 bytes = 3 data packets).
• Step 4i: Total = 0,003s. Note that this step will be performed if the
veriﬁcations performed in 3i fail.
– Computational cost: 0,003s.
– Communication cost: None.
• Step 4ii: Total = 0,004s. Note that this step will be performed if
the veriﬁcations performed in 3i are correct.
– Computational cost: 0,004s.
– Communication cost: None.
Supposing that the execution of this protocol is performed correctly,
when an incidence has not been generated, that is, the veriﬁcations
performed in 3i are correct, the total temporal cost is 1,665s. On the
contrary, if an incidence has been generated, that is, one of the veriﬁ-
cations performed in 3i fails,, then the temporal cost is 1,883s.
Therefore, both results are fast enough in order for them to have time
to communicate in movement. The temporal length of communication
window, in which both entities are able to transmit information at 60
km/h along 250m of distance, is 15s. Thus, there is a high margin
between 1,883s and 15s, and even more if the velocity of the vehicle is
lower.
After these detailed simulations, the online feasibility of the system has
been stated. In particular, the capability of generating a certiﬁcate in a SE
accomplishing with the protocol within a reasonable period of time, has been
proven. Both parts of the protocol with higher temporal restrictions, Check-in
and Check-out, have been also demonstrated to be feasible in movement.
4.8.2 Study of the Electronic Payment System Adaption
The electronic payment system is used by the users to pay the charged fees
associated to the use of the LEZ after the V leaves the LEZ. The payment
system, as it is speciﬁed in the model section 4.2.2, has to be anonymous and
untraceable, that is, the payment has to prevent from the identiﬁcation of the
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payer and from the link of payments made by the same payer. Otherwise,
the payment could be used by the SP to identify the users of the LEZ, and
even to know about the vehicles’ routes.
The electronic payment system has to be disassociated from the LEZ
system, so that:
• The payment could not just be made by the D, but also by other pas-
sengers or even by a business.
• The payment is made a posteriori, after the V has left the LEZ and
within a billing period.
• The users of the LEZ, who have not payed or who have an incorrect
payment associated to their trips, have to be sanctioned. Thus, the
interest of the users will be to get a proper payment.
Under these conditions, there are some suitable electronic payment sys-
tems: Bank transfers (i.e. by means of a payment card), traditional electronic
money (i.e. eCash [43]) and other electronic coins based on hashes (such as
Bitcoin [44]). The ﬁrst one, which is well known, is based on a Third Trusted
Party (TTP) and on the use of a numeric identiﬁer (i.e. an account number
or card number), which keep the payer identity protected. The second one,
which is anonymous by deﬁnition and does not require from a TTP, has
been applied minimally in the real world due to some usability limitations.
The last one is a recent digital money based on a peer-to-peer system, which
was proposed by Satoshi Nakamoto. In this kind of electronic coins, users
can transfer money with no intermediaries by means of hash functions and
other cryptographic techniques.
The last payment system stands out above the others due to the absence
of TTP and its wide real application. Despite of this, it suffers from a lack of
privacy due to its public ledger. Bitcoin transactions or blockchains are as-
sociated to users by means of pseudonyms and are composed of other iden-
tiﬁable information such as the sender and receiver public address, among
other metadata. All these historic information, which by design composes
each Bitcoin, is publicly stored permanently and is accessible to everyone.
As a result, Bitcoin traceability is possible climbing between transactions.
The transactions of a Bitcoin can be followed from the last to its origin,
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thus obtaining more details about each transaction. Even more, blockchain
analysis techniques could be used to deanonymize part of the Bitcoin trans-
actions, linking several public addresses to a same user. By means of data
mining techniques, it can be performed by analyzing the blockchain path of
the change of transaction.
Some solutions to this traceability issue, which are more suitable than
others, can be found in the literature. From less to more privacy measures,
each user could create several public addresses in order that tracing be-
comes a difﬁcult purpose. However, it does not provide enough privacy
since it is impossible to generate inﬁnite addresses. Another measures is
to launder Bitcoins through a TTP, which works as a mix network [45],
randomizing a set of Bitcoins anonymously. In this way, Bitcoins of dif-
ferent owners are exchanged without knowing their origin and they are
received in new addresses, thus breaking the owner thread. Even so, Ze-
rocoin [46] is able to improve it by removing the TTP. This is an extension
of the Bitcoin system, which allows the users to purchase Zerocoins and to
later recover Bitcoins, using cryptographic accumulators, commitments and
Zero-knowledge proofs, avoiding any possible link between the addresses.
Therefore, the use of Bitcoins with the Zerocoin extension can be suitable as
the electronic payment system of the LEZ system, since it accomplishes with
the anonymity and untraceability requirements speciﬁed above.
In addition, as it has been seen in Section 4.5.2, the use of a reference
linking between transaction and a trip in LEZ (γo) is needed. Besides, it
helps to solve some attacks related to the payment such as double spending.
Consequently, the electronic payment system used will add the reference in
the transaction.
In bank transfers, it is possible to add a reference to the transfer subject.
In other systems, such as Bitcoin, there is a speciﬁc setting which allows the
sender to add any information of what she wants.
In the case of the Bitcoin system, the sender can add an optional memo in
the payment message. Therefore, Bitcoins can be easily adapted considering
that the payment message generated after a transaction can be used as a proof-
of-payment γp. The Payment veriﬁcation phase will be carried out after the
network nodes have performed their veriﬁcations of the blockchains. If more
quicker veriﬁcations are required, nodes could be reward, as it is considered
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
4.8. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 63
in the Bitcoin system. In particular, step 6 of Section 4.5 will be performed by
nodes of the network. The SP will only have to verify that the veriﬁcations
of the nodes have been properly performed and that the result is correct.
Hence, the existence of electronic payment systems to be adapted in this
system is stated, which accomplish the required properties (anonymity and
untraceability). These systems could be easily modiﬁed to address the pay-
ment in the Check-out process at the time of departure the LEZ. In addition
the anonymity and untraceability requirements, the payment should accom-
plish a hard temporary requirement, in which this systems sould be quick
enough to be performed in movement together with the Check-out phase.
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Chapter 5
Privacy-Preserving Electronic
Road Pricing System for Low
Emission Zones with Dynamic
Pricing
In this chapter, a new Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) is proposed with the aim to
detect fraud while preserving drivers’ privacy. More concretely, it provides a non-
probabilistic fraud control and the control points only take pictures of the vehicles
that misbehave. Last but not least, the proposed system applies to an enhanced dy-
namic pricing that can help the authorities to better distribute trafﬁc over the road
network.
The novelty of the system is introduced in §5.1. In §5.2, the basis of system, the
architecture, the involved participants, and the requirements are presented. After
that, §5.3 gives an overall idea of the system scheme. The main scheme is composed
of Setup Protocol (§5.4), Certiﬁcation Protocol (§5.5, Payment Protocol (§4.5), En-
trance Protocol (§5.7), and Off-line Protocol (§5.8). Security and privacy require-
ments are evaluated in §5.9. Finally, the analysis of functional requirements is
presented in §5.10.
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5.1 Novelty of the Approach
In this chapter, a new ERP system for Low Emission Zones (LEZs), which
follows a dynamic pricing approach independently for each road stretch, is
proposed. Unlike the proposal presented in Chapter 4, this systems allows
a distribution of the trafﬁc in the LEZ because the toll costs can be updated
according to the use of the stretch. The system generates trafﬁc feedback in
real time, which is useful for such purpose. Drivers would then be able to
re-plan their routes according to the toll costs, and thus, load-balance the
trafﬁc.
As it is stated in Chapter 2, the systems that can be found in the litera-
ture ([1, 3, 4, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]) detect fraud probabilistically by taking photos
of vehicles at random places. These systems use this information to verify
whether drivers are honest when paying for the covered path. Moreover, the
set of photos of vehicles taken by checkpoints at random places generates a
loss of drivers’ privacy, since all the vehicles, honest or not, are registered
in a set of points. The system proposed provides a non-probabilistic fraud
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control while preserving privacy of honest drivers as in the previous pro-
posal presented (Chapter 4). In this way, only vehicles that misbehave are
registered and identiﬁed by means of anonymity revocation. In particular,
honest drivers keep their privacy and their identity, and their routes are not
disclosed. For this reason, drivers are expected to collaborate with the sys-
tem and to behave correctly in order to keep their privacy. Moreover, unlike
other systems, OBUs do not register vehicles’ geo-locations.
The resulting scheme has been tested in terms of deployment feasibility
and the results show that the provided proposal is realistic and it may be
deployed in practical scenarios. In addition, this works includes a simula-
tion in order to assess the effect of dynamic pricing of stretches in a trafﬁc
network.
The new ERP system, which is presented in this chapter, is supported
by:
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Privacy-
Preserving Electronic Toll System with Dynamic Pricing for Low Emis-
sion Zones” In 9th International Workshop on Data Privacy Management
(DPM 2014) pp. 327–334. 2014.
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Privacy-
Preserving Electronic Road Pricing System for Low Emission Zones
with Dynamic Pricing” In International Journal of Security and Commu-
nication Networks 2015. Under review.
5.2 System Model
In this section, a conceptual model of the system is presented. This model
includes deﬁnitions of the architecture and the participants, as well as re-
quirements of the system.
5.2.1 Architecture and Participants
Driver D is the person who drives a vehicle in a LEZ. Vehicle V is the means
of transport registered by a unique D (the owner of it) but it may be driven
by several Ds. V has an identiﬁer (the vehicle plate) that connects it to the
owner. Each V has a Secure Element SE and an On-board unit OBU. The ﬁrst is
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a tamper-proof security module installed in each V by the competent trafﬁc
authority. It performs all sensitive operations to ensure the security require-
ments; The second is a device with more computational power and storage
capacity than SE. This device connects SE with the user and performs the
less sensitive protocol operations. It has location (GPS) and wireless com-
munication capabilities.
A LEZ is a restricted area where vehicles can access in exchange for a pay-
ment according to the pollutant emissions of the vehicle. A LEZ is divided
into a set of street stretches. A stretch is a one-way section of street where
Vs have to pay every time they drive through it. Each stretch is divided
into a payment area and a trafﬁc restricted area. A Beacon is a device, placed
at the payment area, which constantly warns the Vs entering the stretch. A
Checkpoint Chp, placed at the entrance of the restricted area of a stretch, aims
to control the access of vehicles that enter the stretch. Service Provider SP,
which manages both, offers an ERP service for urban areas thanks to a con-
cession contract with the local public administration (i.e. City Council). This
entity, apart from having the right to offer this service, is responsible for
managing the system. SP is also responsible for pricing each stretch accord-
ing to its trafﬁc density. Ticket Provider TP, which has access to the prices
and which is also managed by SP, issues tickets to Vs when they are driving
on the payment area. The proposal also considers other actors maintained
by other authorities: Vehicle Certiﬁcation Authority VCA, which is maintained
by the trafﬁc competent authority and provides credentials to Vs; Payment
Service PS is a trusted entity that depends on the electronic payment system
(i.e. Visa or Mastercard). It enables Ds to pay the circulation fees to Service
Provider. PS is a part of the electronic payment system, which acts as a inter-
face between the user and the electronic payment system. It is assumed that
the payment system leaves some ﬂexibility for adapting the behavior of PS.
This behavior will be detailed in the following sections. The authentication
between a user and PS also depends on the electronic payment system used.
The credentials, which are required for such purpose, have been assumed
as an asymmetric key pair and its public key certiﬁcate. Following the nota-
tion used in this work, the user’s credentials are (Pkpy,Skpy) and certpy, and
PS’s credentials are (PkPS,SkPS) and certPS; and ﬁnally, Punishment Authority
PA, which is supported by a competent law enforcement authority and com-
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posed of a set of m sub-entities (or sub-authorities), is able to recover and
reveal the identity of the owner of the V in case of fraud.
5.2.2 Requirements
The system requirements are related to fraud, privacy, authenticity and func-
tionality, and they are described below in order to establish the foundations
of the system.
Anti-fraud Requirements.
When a V is in the entrance of a stretch, it needs to obtain a valid ticket in
order to properly enter it. TP issues tickets and requires V a valid payment.
Otherwise, TP does not issue a ticket.
A payment, which is generated by PS and requested by TP in order to
issue a ticket, is considered valid when (i) it cannot be modiﬁed once gener-
ated without detection (integrity); (ii) the PS can prove that this proof belongs
to it (authenticity); (iii) PS cannot deny its authorship (non-repudiation); (iv)
the amount of money required to be paid by V is fairly calculated by TP;
and also, (v) it has not been reused (uniqueness).
A payment is fair when (i) the prices used to compute the amount of
money required to pay, which are ﬁxed by SP, are valid; (ii) the amount of
money required to be paid is correctly calculated according to the emission
category of V, the stretch and valid prices;
The prices of a stretch (αstr∗), which are ﬁxed by SP, are considered
valid when (i) they cannot be modiﬁed once generated without detection
(integrity); (ii) SP can prove that prices belong to it (authenticity); (iii) SP
cannot deny its authorship (non-repudiation); (iv) they have not exceeded
a ﬁxed time after their generation (temporality); (v) and, they belongs to a
certain stretch (stretch belonging)
A ticket is considered valid when (i) it cannot be modiﬁed once gen-
erated without detection (integrity); (ii) the issuer TP can prove that the
ticket has been issued by it (ticket authenticity); (iii) the V can prove that
the ticket belongs to it (ownership); (iv) they cannot deny its authorship
(non-repudiation); (v) it has not exceeded a ﬁxed time after its generation
(temporality); (vi) it is associated to a certain stretch of the LEZ (stretch belong-
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ing); and (vii) it is associated to a valid payment. Tickets contain information
to prove that a speciﬁc V (owner) has the right to enter a certain stretch. The
ticket is linked to a V and a validity time ts, which guarantee that the ticket
can be used neither by another V’, nor after this period of time.
Fraud is committed by a D when she drives in a stretch of a LEZ (i)
without a ticket; (ii) with an invalid ticket; (iii) with a valid ticket but associated
with another V/stretch; or (iv) with a valid ticket, which has been previously used
to access the stretch (reused).
A false accusation takes place when a SP unjustly claims that a V (i) have
no ticket; (ii) has an invalid ticket; or (iii) has a valid ticket that belongs to another
V. On the contrary, a V cannot falsely accuse an honest SP of fraud.
Entity Authenticity Requirements.
The entities involved in the system exchange information. When the com-
munication is established, each entity must prove their identity to the other
part. In this way, each entity can be sure that the protocol is executed with
the right one. If this is not the case, this action must be reported.
Privacy Requirements.
The fraud control executed by SP can endanger the privacy of the Ds. In
this case, the curiosity of SP could cause an excessive monitoring of the
system or could even trace the itinerary of a speciﬁc V. With the aim of
avoiding this excessive control by SP over the Vs, the system must (i) assure
the anonymity (the identity of D or V cannot be linked to any itinerary); (ii)
avoid the linkability between itineraries (SP must not relate more than one
itinerary to a same V); and (iii) provide revocable anonymity to D (if a D
commits fraud, SP must know the identity).
Functional Requirements.
The communication between Vs and Chps/ beacons needs to (i) be started
when a V is close to a Chps/beacons, (ii) be carried out when a V is mov-
ing, and (iii) let Chp communicate with the nearest V. The communication
has to start when a V is detected near to a Chps/beacons, for example, by
broadcasting the information required to establish the communication. This
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broadcast could be carried out by the use of Bluetooth Low Energy technol-
ogy. Moreover, the communication in movement ([41]) can be possible by
combining low and medium distance communication technologies, such as
Wimax, ZigBee IEEE 802.15.4 or Bluetooth IEEE 802.15.1, using directional
antennas or triangulation. Finally, the communication technology and the
computation required by the protocol must be quick enough for a Chp and
a Vs to communicate between them without stopping. In addition, a fast
mobile broadband communication is required for Vs and TP/PS to commu-
nicate between them. Any interaction with the D should be easy and agile.
The Payment Service should be anonymous and quick enough to allow the
transaction when the V enters the stretch.
5.3 General Overview
The main purpose of a LEZ is to reduce the emissions of a urban zone with
a tax payment. In this proposal, LEZs are composed of a set of stretches.
Figure 5.1 shows an example of a LEZ composed of stretches.
Figure 5.1: Example of a composition of a LEZ
Hence, the goal of this work is to allow the distribution of the trafﬁc
in the LEZ with the aim of reducing the travel time of each V as well as
trafﬁc jams. This is achieved with the dynamic assignment of prices for each
stretch. As the trafﬁc conditions are constantly changing, prices have to be
adapted to such conditions. In such a way, every certain period of time, SP
prices each stretch (see Section 5.6.1 Price generation), per emission category
and depending on its trafﬁc density. Therefore, Ds are suggested to re-plan
their route in order to cover less expensive routes (note that it depends on
the distance to be covered, the consumption of fuel and the prices of the
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stretches).
In order to achieve it, the system needs (i) to be initialized in Setup
Protocol (Section 5.4); (ii) the certiﬁcation of V and the generation of new
credentials in Certiﬁcation Protocol (Section 5.5); (iii) Vs to obtain a ticket
through a payment in order to enter each stretch. The Payment Protocol
(Section 5.6) includes the price of stretch and the way in which a V obtains a
ticket. (iv) Vs to deliver a ticket in order to accesses the stretch in the Entrance
Protocol (Section 5.7); (v) veriﬁcations in order to detect and sanction Ds that
misbehave in Off-line Protocol (Section 5.8). Henceforth, these protocols are
overviewed below:
Setup Protocol: Before starting the system, the entities PA, VCA, SP,
TP, Chps and Beacons are initialized (Section 5.4)
Certiﬁcation Protocol: SEs are initialized with a certiﬁcation entity
(see Section 3.2.2: Certiﬁcate Entity Installation). Afterwards, SE gener-
ates different credentials for V (see Section 3.2.3: Certiﬁcate Generation)
every time it enters a LEZ (i.e. when the vehicle’s engine is started up or
just when the D is aware of her intentions of entering a LEZ) in order to
correctly authenticate with other entities and to avoid linkability between
their itineraries.
Payment Protocol: Beacons, placed at the beginning of the payment
area of stretches, constantly send a warning message information-of-stretch
(βstr). A vehicle V, when entering a payment area of a stretch str (see Sec-
tion 5.6.2: Ticket Acquisition), receives a warning message from a beacon
containing information of the current stretch. V then obtains the current
prices of the stretch from TP, which has previously generated by SP for
each stretch (see Section: 5.6.1 Price generation). According to the prices
and its emission category, V makes a payment through PS and obtains a
proof-of-payment. V then sends it to TP, which veriﬁes the payment and
issues a ticket (θ) associated with the V, the stretch and an expiration time.
Entrance Protocol: When a Chp placed at the beginning of the re-
stricted area detects V (Section 5.7), which is getting close and which is
in possession of a valid ticket, it communicates with V. They then mutu-
ally authenticate and V sends the ticket. When the authentication with V
and the veriﬁcation of the ticket fail, and only in this situation, Chp takes
a picture of the V license plate as evidence of the infringement in order
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to generate an incidence. This proof is sent to PA in order to verify the
existence of fraud and so as to proceed with the corresponding sanction.
On the other hand, when they are correct, V receives a proof-of-entrance
as a receipt, and enters the restricted area of the stretch without being
photographed.
While V remains in the LEZ, every time V enters a new stretch, the
phase Ticket Acquisition (Section 5.6.2) of the Payment Protocol and the
Entrance Protocol (Section 5.7) are repeated. Figure 5.2 shows the way in
which a V obtains a ticket and enters the stretch.
Figure 5.2: Entrance and Ticket Acquisition scheme
Off-line Protocol: The detection of reused tickets are performed ev-
ery certain period of time (see Section 5.8.1: Doublespending Veriﬁca-
tion). Afterwards, PA veriﬁes the incidences received (see Section 5.8.2:
Sanction Process). Evidences to refute the accusation are then requested
to V by SP. In case of fraud, PA reveals the identity of V (anonymity is
revoked) and sanctions the owner.
The notation used and the proofs generated in this scheme are presented
in tables 5.3 and 5.3, respectively.
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Notation Name Description
(Pke, Ske) Asymmetric key pair, public and private,
belonging to entity e
Ence(m) Encryption of the message m using Ence(m) = EPke (m)
the asymmetric public key Pke = m′
Dece(m′) Decryption of the encrypted message m′ using ESke (m′) =
the asymmetric private key Ske ESke (EPke (m)) = m
certe Public key certiﬁcate of the Pke of entity e It includes Pke,
supplied by CAi signCAi (h(Pke|...)), etc.
f inge Fingerprint of the public key certiﬁcate Pke It is computed by using
of entity e a Hash function of the
public key certiﬁcate
certe.ext Certiﬁcate extension ext of the public
key certiﬁcate certe
Signe(m) or m¯ Digital signature of the message m by entity e Signe(m)=
ESke (h(m)) = m¯
Veri fe(m, m¯) Veriﬁcation of the digital signature m¯ by Veri fe(m, m¯) = EPke (m¯)
entity e = EPke (ESke (h(m)))
= h(m)?
m∗ Set of infomation composed of the message m∗ = (m, m¯)
and its signature
h(m) Hash image of the message m
Nx Nonce X It is a random number
used in the authentication
Table 5.1: Notation
Proofs Name Content
αstr information-of-prices αstr=(str, pricescat, pexp, accd))
βstr information-of-stretch Information of the street stretch the V enters and
information of TP connection which deﬁnes how
to access TP
γ ticket-request γ = (REQ, NA, str′)
δ payment-request δ = (REQ, NA, str′, NB, ts, ticketid, f ingVq ,
amount, αstr)
 payment-order  = (ACK, NC , f ingPS, accs, amount, accd, REF)
ζ1 transfer-proof-1 ζ1 = (amount, accd, REF)
ζ2 transfer-proof-2 ζ2 = (accs, amount, accd)
η payment-proof η = (NB, ζ1∗)
θ ticket θ = (ticketid, str, ts, f ingVq , η
∗)
ι entrance-warning ι = (PET, ND)
λ ticket-proof λ = (PET, ND , NE, f ingChp, θ∗)
μi proof-of-entrance-incidence μi=(ini , plt, ph, ts′, str′, λ∗, certVq )
μv proof-of-veriﬁcation-incidence μv = (inv, (ν∗, certVq ), (ν∗
′, certVq ),
(ν∗′′, certVq ), etc.)
ν proof-of-entrance ν=(ts′, NE, f ing′Vq , λ
∗)
Table 5.2: Proofs and data generated in the execution of the protocol
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5.4 Setup Protocol
During the setup protocol, the following entities are initialized:
1. PA: This entity is constituted by a set of m members. An asymmetric
key pair (PkPA, SkPA) is securely generated with a threshold scheme
such as in [36]. The SkPA is divided into m pieces or shares and is
securely distributed among the m entities. From competent authorities
(i.e. Police) they obtain its public key certiﬁcate certPA, and a certiﬁcate
repository of the authorities
2. VCA generates and associates, as it is detailed in Section 3.2.1, a certi-
ﬁcation authority VCACi for each group of users, that is, for each ele-
ment of the subset K = {C1,C2, ...,CnumK}, consisting of an asymmetric
key pair (PkVCACi , SkVCACi ), and CA certiﬁcate certVCACi
3. SP, TP and each Chp apply the following steps:
i. Securely generate an asymmetric key pair (PkSP, SkSP), (PkTP,
SkTP) and (PkChp, SkChp), respectively
ii. Securely obtain the public key certiﬁcate (certSP, certTP and
certChp) from the competent authorities (i.e. city council). The
certSP validity period could correspond to the concession lifetime
of the service, without exceeding it. Furthermore, certChp contains
an extension certChp.loc with its location coordinates and a stretch
identiﬁer certChp.str, which links the Chp with a certain stretch
iii. Securely obtain a certiﬁcate repository of the authorities
4. Beacons are initialized by SP with a warning advise information-of-
stretch βstr∗=(βstr,βstr), where βstr is the signature of βstr(SignSP(βstr))
and where βstr contains:
• Information of the stretch the V enters (such as str, GPS location
coordinates, etc.)
• Information of TP connection which deﬁnes how to access TP
(through 3G, ZigBee or other technologies)
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5.5 Certiﬁcation Protocol
This protocol consists of two phases: In the ﬁrst phase, a certiﬁcation entity
is installed in the SE of a V by VCA. In the second phase, the SE, which has
been previously initialized, generates new credentials every time it enters a
LEZ.
5.5.1 Certiﬁcate Entity Installation
In this phase, Vehicle Certiﬁcation Authority VCA registers a user in a group
of users (an element of the subset K) and securely installs the corresponding
Certiﬁcation Authority VCACi associated to Ci in the SE of each V, consisting
of PkVCACi , SkVCACi and certVCACi . This phase is performed from time to
time, for example, before purchasing a vehicle and/or passing the regular
technical vehicle tests. Check Section 3.2.2 for further details.
5.5.2 Certiﬁcate Generation
The SE of the V, which has a certiﬁcation entity VCACi installed, gener-
ates new credentials. The resulting credentials consist of an asymmetric key
pair (PkVq , SkVq) and a public key certiﬁcate certVq containing an extension
certVq .idS, which is the encryption of the vehicle identiﬁer Vid EncPkPA(Vid).
This phase is performed every time a V is on its way to enter a LEZ in order
to avoid linkability between its trips. For example, when the vehicle’s engine
is started up or just when the D decides enter a LEZ. Check Section 3.2.1 for
more information about this phase.
The repetitive execution of this phase can produce a a large amount of
data since many asymmetric key pairs and their public key certiﬁcates are
generated. Considering the limited storage capabilities of SEs, it could be
interesting to securely store the information concerning to previous LEZ
entrances in the OBU by means of key management custody techniques ([38,
39]).
5.6 Payment Protocol
In this section, the functional part of the system where users pay for access-
ing a trafﬁc restricted zone is described. The payment protocol is described
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in the following two subsections: price generation and ticket acquisition.
5.6.1 Price Generation
Every ﬁxed period of time, SP establishes the prices of each stretch str by
performing the next operations:
1. Set the prices per emission category pricescat (i.e. European Emission
Standards), searching a balance between supply and demand. The
supply is the number of vehicles that a stretch can contain. It depends
on the stretch capacity (the number of lanes and their length) and the
current occupancy, which can be counted in various ways (such as with
an induction loop or by accounting the entrance of the next stretch).
The demand is variable and depends on the number of vehicles that
want to enter the stretch. The calculation to ﬁnd a right price, where
demand is unknown in advance, is a known issue in other ﬁelds such
as mobile networks. [47] is an example of a calculation method, which
predicts the demand and could be easily adapted to the present con-
text.
2. Compose information-of-prices αstr=(str, pricescat, pexp, accd), where pexp
is the expiration time and accd identiﬁes the SP destination account of
the electronic payment system.
3. Sign αstr: SignSP(αstr) = αstr, send αstr∗ to TP
5.6.2 Ticket Acquisition
In this phase, the acquisition of a ticket by a V, before entering a stretch, is
described. Therefore, when Beacons, which are placed at the beginning of the
payment area of the stretches, detects a V, the following steps are applied:
1. The Beacon sends V an information-of-stretch βstr′ ∗
2. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Verify the signature βstr′ : Veri fSP(βstr′ , βstr′)
ii. Verify GPS location coordinates included in βstr′ .
iii. Extract str′from βstr′
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iv. Generate a nonce NA and a ticket request REQ
v. Compose a ticket-request γ = (REQ, NA, str′)
vi. Sign γ: SignVq(γ) = γ, and send γ
∗ and its certiﬁcate certVq to TP
3. TP has to:
i. Verify the certiﬁcate certVq and the signature γ: Veri fSP(γ, γ)
ii. Generate a nonce NB and a time ts, increment a counter ticketid,
and compute the f ingVq of certVq
iii. Recover αstr∗ of the requested stretch and obtain amount from
pricescat according to its pollutant emissions certVq .em
iv. Compose a payment-request δ = (REQ, NA, str′, NB, ts, ticketid,
f ingVq , amount, αstr)
v. Sign δ: SignTP(δ) = δ, and send NB, ticketid, ts, amount, δ and αstr∗
to V
4. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Verify the signature αstr: Veri fSP(str′, pricescat, pexp, accd, αstr), and
verify the freshness of αstr∗:|pexp-current time| < τ, where τ is a
ﬁxed time interval
ii. Obtain the amount′ of money required to pay according to the pol-
lutant emissions certVq .em of V and the current pricescat, included
in αstr
iii. Verify the signature δ: Veri fPS(REQ, NA, str′, NB, ts, ticketid,
f ingVq , amount
′, αstr, δ), and verify the freshness of ts: ts-current
time| < τ′, where τ′ is a ﬁxed time interval
iv. Access PS and establish a secure communication channel (i.e. by
means of TLS/SSL protocol)
5. PS generates a nonce NC, and sends it to V
6. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Compute the f ingPS of certPS
ii. Compute a reference REF = hash(δ)
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iii. Recover the destination account accd and pricescat from αstr
iv. Compose a payment-order  = (NC, f ingPS, accs, amount, accd, REF),
where accs is the source account of the user
v. Sign1 : Signpy() = 
vi. Send accs, amount, accd, REF,  and the certiﬁcate certpy to PS
7. PS has to:
i. Verify the certiﬁcate certpy and the signature : Veri fpy(, )
ii. Extract accs, amount and accd from  and make a digital transfer
of amount from the account accs to the account accd
iii. Compose a transfer-proof-1 ζ1 = (amount, accd, REF)
iv. Compose a transfer-proof-2 ζ2 = (accs, amount, accd)
v. Sign ζ1: SignPS(ζ1) = ζ1, and sign ζ2: SignPS(ζ2) = ζ2
vi. Send ζ1 and ζ2 to the payer
vii. Send ζ2∗ to SP every certain period of time, in batch, jointly with
other ζ2∗s from other users and transactions
8. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Verify the signature ζ2: Veri fPS(accs, amount, accd, ζ2)
ii. Verify the signature ζ1: Veri fPS(amount, accd, REF, ζ1)
iii. Compose a payment-proof η = (NB, ζ1∗)
iv. Sign η: SignVq(η) = η, and send η and ζ1 to TP
9. TP has to:
i. Verify the signature η: Veri fVq(NB, ζ1
∗, η)
ii. Compute the reference REF′ = hash(δ)
iii. Verify the signature ζ1: Veri fPS(amount, accd, REF′, ζ1)
iv. Compose a ticket θ = (ticketid, str, ts, f ingVq , η
∗) = (ticketid, str, ts,
f ingVq , NB, amount, accd, REF, ζ1, η)
v. Sign θ: SignTP(θ) = θ, and send θ to V
1Note that the payment of a stretch is made by the user or D with its payment credentials,
which depends on the electronic payment
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10. The SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, veriﬁes the signature θ:
Veri fTP(ticketid, str, ts, f ingVq , η
∗, θ)
5.7 Entrance Protocol
The entrance process takes place when a V is approaching a restricted area
after passing the payment zone. A Chp, which is placed at the beginning of
the restricted area of a stretch, then requires the V to deliver a ticket in order
to get into it. The following steps are applied when a Chp detects a V:
1. Chp has to:
i. Generate a nonce ND and a ticket petition PET
ii. Compose an entrance-warning ι = (PET, ND)
iii. Sign ι: SignChp(ι) = ι, and send ι∗ and its certiﬁcate certChp to V
2. SE of the V, with the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Verify the certiﬁcate certChp, the GPS location coordinates
certChp.loc and the stretch identiﬁer certChp.str = str, which is in-
cluded in θ
ii. Verify the signature ι: Veri fChp(ι, ι)
iii. Generate a nonce NE and compute the f ingChp of certChp
iv. Compose a ticket-proof λ = (PET, ND, NE, f ingChp, θ∗)
v. Sign λ: SignVq(λ) = λ, and send NE, θ
∗, λ and its certVq to Chp
3. Chp has to:
i. Generate a time ts′
ii. Verify the certiﬁcate certVq and the signature λ: Veri fVq(ND,
f ingChp, NE, θ∗, λ)
iii. Recover certChp.str and compute the ﬁngerprint f ing′Vq of certVq
iv. Verify the signature θ: Veri fTP(ticketid, certChp.str, ts, f ing′Vq , η
∗, θ)
v. Verify certChp.str = str, which is included in θ
vi. Verify the freshness of θ∗:|ts − ts′| < τ′′, where τ′′ is a time ﬁxed
interval according to the trafﬁc volume of the stretch.
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vii. If one of the veriﬁcations fails or ticket-proof has not sent, Chp per-
forms the following operations:
vii.i Generate an incidence number of entrance ini
vii.ii Take a photo ph of V and extract the plate number plt
vii.iii Compose a proof-of-entrance-incidence μi=(ini, plt, ph, ts′,
str′, λ∗, certVq)
vii.iv Sign μi: SignChp(μi) = μi, and send μi∗ and certChp to SP
through a secure channel
viii. If the veriﬁcations performed in 3ii-3vi are correct, Chp has to:
viii.i Compose proof-of-entrance ν=(ts′, NE, f ing′Vq , λ
∗)
viii.ii Sign ν: SignChp(ν) = ν, and send ts′ and ν to the V
4. If the veriﬁcations performed in 3ii-3vi are correct, SE of the V, with
the help of the OBU, has to:
i. Verify the signature ν: Veri fChp(ts′, NE, f ing′Vq , λ
∗, ν)
5.8 Off-line Protocol
This protocol is composed of two phases. Both are performed in batch after
a certain period of time. In the ﬁrst phase, SP detects whether fraud is
committed by reused tickets. In the second one, PA veriﬁes all the incidences
generated by the systems and sanctions the Vs that misbehave.
5.8.1 Doublespending Veriﬁcation
Each Chp periodically sends SP the pair proof-of-entrances ν∗ and the associ-
ated certiﬁcate of vehicle certVq , and also the proof-of-entrance-incidences μi
∗,
which are generated in Section 5.7. Then SP forwards the incidences μi∗ to
PA through a secure channel. Moreover, SP performs the next operations, in
batch, every certain period of time:
1. Deﬁne a set of pairs of proof-of-entrance
I =
{
(ν1
∗, certV1), (ν2∗, certV2), ..., (νnν∗, certVnν )
}
, where nν is the num-
ber of proof-of-entrance sent to TP
2. Verify that there is a unique ν in the set I with the same θ∗
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3. If more than a ν with the same θ∗ are found (ν∗′, ν∗′′, ...), SP then needs
to:
i. Generate an incidence number of veriﬁcation inv
ii. Compose proof-of-veriﬁcation-incidence μv including the concerned
proofs-of-entrance ν∗: μv = (inv, (ν∗, certVq), (ν∗
′, certVq), (ν∗
′′, certVq),
...), which proves the doublespending
iii. Sign μv: SignSP(μv)=μv, and send μv∗ to PA through a secure chan-
nel
5.8.2 Sanction Process
This section is the last phase of the system, where incidences generated by SP
are evaluated in order to sanction dishonest users. The Punishment Authority
PA performs the following sanction process:
For each received μ∗, the following operations are performed:
1. In the case of μi∗:
i. The m sub-entities of PA perform the following operations:
i.i. Verify certChp and certVq
i.ii. Compute the ﬁngerprint f ing′′Chp of certChp and the ﬁnger-
print f ing′′Vq of certVq
i.iii. Recover certChp.str
i.iv. Extract the plate number plt′ of the photo ph
i.v. Verify the signature μi: (ini, plt′, ph, ts′, certChp.str, λ∗, certVq ,
μi)
i.vi. Verify the signature λ: Veri fVq(ND, f ing
′′
Chp, NE, θ
∗, λ)
i.vii. Verify the signature θ: Veri fTP(ticketid, certChp.str, ts, f ing′′Vq ,
η∗, θ)
i.viii. Verify the freshness of θ∗:|ts− ts′| < τ′′
i.ix. If one of the previous veriﬁcations fails, that is, the incidence
is conﬁrmed by a least t from m members of PA, the f ingVq
of certVq is then made public. An example could be using a
Bulletin Board, which is widely used in many countries such
as the “Tablo´n Edictal de Sanciones de Tra´ﬁco” of the Spanish
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Ministry of Internal Affairs2. In a private zone of the Bulletin
Board, the proofs presented by the SP are uploaded. Note
that, at this point, some of the considered veriﬁcations might
not be performed since the required proofs might not be sent
or generated by V. This case is considered and dealt with as
an incidence.
ii. The owner of the V performs the following operations:
ii.i. Look for ﬁngerprints of her CertVq in the Bulletin Board every
certain period of time
ii.ii. If one of her ﬁngerprints is found on the Bulletin Board
ii.ii.i. Obtain more information of the sanction process
by accessing the private zone of the Bulletin Board.
The access to the private bulletin board is controlled
by the authentication with the credentials SkVq and
certVq .
ii.ii.ii. Send evidences to PA in order to refute her accusa-
tion. These evidences, which could be proofs gen-
erated in the execution of the protocol, will depend
on the previous unsuccessful veriﬁcations.
iii. The m sub-entities of PA have to:
iii.i. Verify the evidences presented by the owner of the V to
refute the accusation
iii.ii. If the presented contra evidences are not considered valid
by at least t from m members of PA, they have to:
iii.ii.i. Extract the number plate plt from the photograph
ph
iii.ii.ii. Identify the owner of the V by using plt
iii.ii.iii. Fine the owner of V according to the type of infrac-
tion
2. In the case of μv∗:
i. The m sub-entities of PA perform the following operations:
2https://sede.dgt.gob.es/es/tramites-y-multas/alguna-multa/consulta-tablon-edictal-
testra/
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i.i. Verify the signature μv: (inv, (ν∗, certVq), (ν∗
′, certVq), (ν∗
′′,
certVq), ..., μv)
i.ii. For each pair (ν∗, certVq):
ii.ii.i Verify certVq
ii.ii.ii Compute the ﬁngerprint f ing′′Vq of certVq
ii.ii.iii Verify the signature ν: Veri fChp(ts′, NE, f ing′′Vq , λ
∗, ν)
ii.ii.iv Verify the signature λ: Veri fVq(ND, f ingChp, NE, θ
∗,
λ)
ii.ii.v Verify the signature θ: Veri fTP(ticketid, str, ts,
f ing′′Vq , η
∗, θ)
i.iii. Verify that each ν has the same θ∗
i.iv. If all the veriﬁcations are correct, that is, the incidence is
conﬁrmed by a least t from m members of PA, the f ingVq
of certVq is made public, for example in a Bulletin Board. The
proofs presented by the SP are uploaded in a private zone of
the Bulletin Board.
ii. The owner of V performs the following operations:
ii.i. Look for ﬁngerprints of her CertVq in the Bulletin Board every
certain period of time
ii.ii. Obtain more information of the sanction process, through
the authentication with her credentials (SkVq and certVq), if
one of her ﬁngerprints is found on the Bulletin Board, and
get access to the private zone of the Bulletin Board
ii.iii. Send evidences to PA in order to refute her accusation.
These evidences, which could be proofs generated in the
execution of the protocol, will depend on the previous un-
successful veriﬁcations.
iii. The m sub-entities of PA have to:
iii.i. Verify the evidences presented by the owner of the V to
refute the accusation
iii.ii. If the presented contra evidences are not considered valid
by at least t from m members of PA, they have to:
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
5.9. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS 85
iii.ii.i. Partially open the extension certVq.idS of the cer-
tiﬁcate certVq, which is included in λ, with their
own shares SkPAm : DecPAm(certVq.idS) = Vidm
iii.ii.ii. Obtain the identiﬁer of the owner of the V (Vid) by
aggregating all Vidm
iii.ii.iii. Fine the owner of V according to the type of infrac-
tion
After the sanction process, if the proofs and the data, which were gen-
erated in the previous protocols (Section 5.7 and 5.6) such as θ∗ and λ∗,
have been subject to no sanction, they can be deleted. It can be particularly
interesting for Vs since the OBU’s storage is not unlimited.
5.9 Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section, the adversary model and the analysis of security and pri-
vacy of the proposed system are presented. In particular, the anti-fraud,
authenticity and privacy requirements are evaluated. that were introduced
in Section 5.2.2.
5.9.1 Adversary Model
Taking into account the entities involved in the proposed architecture and
the existent interactions between them, the following adversaries have been
considered:
• Dishonest driver. There could be drivers interested in avoiding fee pay-
ment. Dishonest drivers can take action against the system by modify-
ing the OBU, which is installed in the V and is accessible by the D. The
modiﬁcation of the OBU is the gateway to all the attacks on the system
promoted by Ds. Note that, a D capable of tampering with an OBU,
may illegally obtain signiﬁcant beneﬁts from the system. This act could
be detected thanks to the physical seal on the OBU, which is checked
by the fully trusted entity VCA (it is maintained by the competent traf-
ﬁc authority). Despite this, this seal does not prevent attackers from
tampering with OBUs. If a D modiﬁes the OBU, she will have a period
of time until the next certiﬁcation, which could be spent to take beneﬁt
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
86
CHAPTER 5. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING
SYSTEM FOR LOW EMISSION ZONES WITH DYNAMIC PRICING
in some way. This is not the case of the SE, which is also managed
by the VCA and is a tamper proof device. The sealing period of time
should be short and controllable in the certiﬁcation process, where the
installation of the new CA credentials in the SE is made physically and
in person by a VCA’s operator. Note that these credentials are an es-
sential requirement to circulate in the LEZ without being ﬁned. A V
with no credentials or obsolete credentials will be identiﬁed, losing its
privacy, and being ﬁnally ﬁned. A part from that, other measures to
prevent possible attacks (such as fraud) will be detailed in this section.
• Dishonest Service Provider. Monitoring all vehicle movements and iden-
tifying both vehicles and drivers can be useful for the SP, because the
system can know when fraud is committed as well as its authorship.
In this way, the system safeguards its interests, punishing dishonest
drivers, although the consequence of this can affect the privacy rights
of the driver. Moreover, SP could groundlessly accuse some V of a
fraud with the desire of collecting more money, or just to know the
real identity of V. The entities Beacons, Checkpoints and Ticket Provider
could participate following the SP purposes since they are managed by
it. For example, if the SP wants to monitor a V, the set of Chps could
act to help it.
• External Attacker. This adversary may be an individual with no relation
with the protocol. This attacker could perform passives attacks such
as a communication eavesdropping on foot of street, or active attacks
such as the modiﬁcation of am OBU of any V, like in the case of a
dishonest driver.
Despite the fact that fraud ﬁghting and privacy protection can sometimes
be contradictory objectives, the goal of the scheme presented in this work is
to address both. It is also important to note that the system is not able to
protect drivers’ privacy against internal or external attackers, who follow Vs
along their trips. This system can also suffer from physical world problems,
which can be solved with measures belonging to a more physical ﬁeld. In
the same way, the system proposed cannot ﬁght against the installation of
parallel cameras, which register Vs passing through Chps, or even against
Chps taking photos of honest Vs irregularly. In this case, Chps would then
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be acting against the protocol. As a result, these sneaky behaviors are not
taken into account in the following security analysis.
Regarding other entities of the proposed system, the PA is considered a
trusted entity because this entity and the set of m sub-entities that compose
it are supported by a competent law enforcement authority. As if that was
not enough, thanks to the use of a threshold scheme, whatever they do has
to be hold by the majority of m, in this case, larger than t. For example, if
a set of these m sub-entities was dishonest, the number of dishonest sub-
entities should be larger than t to be able to take dishonest actions. For
all these reasons, it is assumed that PA is considered a fully trusted entity.
Furthermore, PS is also considered a trusted entity because the electronic
payment system that manages it is, in essence, a trusted entity too.
5.9.2 Security Analysis
The security properties to be guaranteed by the system, which are stated in
Section 5.2: System Model, are fraud, false-accusation and privacy. The se-
curity analysis of these properties is organized in several claims that support
the fulﬁllment of lemmas and theorems.
Anti-Fraud Requirements
Claim 1. The creation of a fraudulent message or proof is computationally
unfeasible nowadays.
Proof. A message is composed of a set of concatenated data. When the
issuer of a message signs it using its asymmetric private key SignIssuer
(message) = message, the generation of tickets is computationally un-
feasible nowadays without the knowledge of the issuer’s secret key used
in the signature. It is assumed that the issuer securely stores its secret key. 
Claim 2. An issuer of a message or proof cannot deny its emission.
Proof. When a message is generated and signed by its issuer and, considering
the signature scheme secure against current computational attacks, this
operation can only be performed by the issuer. Thus, the issuer’s identity
is linked to the proofs and, for the properties of the electronic signature
scheme, it cannot deny its authorship. 
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Claim 3. The content of a message or proof cannot be modiﬁed without
detection.
Proof. Let’s suppose that the signature scheme is secure and that the hash
summary function is collision-resistant. If the content of a signed message
was modiﬁed, the veriﬁcation of the signature would be incorrect because
SignIssuer(message) = ESkIssuer(hash(message)) = message. In order to pass
the veriﬁcation, the signature would be regenerated from the new message.
This operation is computationally unfeasible without the knowledge of the
issuer’s secret key. It is assumed that the issuer securely stores its secret key.

Claim 4. Amessage or proof can be detected when it has expired.
Proof. When a message containing an expiration time ts is generated and
signed by its issuer, and since the message cannot be modiﬁed, as it is stated
in Claim 3, the expiration of a message can be detected using ts. 
Claim 5. A message or proof belongs to a stretch/vehicle.
Proof. When a message containing an identiﬁer of stretch/vehicle is gener-
ated and signed by its issuer, and since the message cannot be modiﬁed, as
it is stated in Claim 3, the relation of stretch/vehicle to a message can be
detected. 
Lemma 5.9.2.1 The proposed system must preserve authenticity,
non-repudiation, integrity, temporality, and stretch belonging for prices in order
that the prices are valid.
Proof. When the issuer of a message is the SP, the message is an information-
of-prices αstr∗ (where the prices are ﬁxed), and the str is an identiﬁer
used to link a stretch with prices, Claims 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 imply that the
properties of authenticity, non-repudiation, integrity, temporality, and
stretch belonging hold for the information-of-prices αstr∗. In the protocol,
these properties are detected in step 4i of Section 5.6. Hence, the proto-
col satisﬁes the needed security requirements, and the prices are thus valid. 
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Claim 6. A payment is fair.
Proof. The amount of money required to be paid by a V, which is contained
in ζ1∗, is fair when (i) TP have calculated it taking into account valid prices
and that prices belong to the stretch that V wants and to the emission category
of V; and (ii) when V has veriﬁed it.
The amount of money is computed in step 3iii of Section 5.6 and it is sent
by TP, jointly with information-of-prices αstr∗, with a signed payment-request
δ∗. Considering that (i) the validity of prices is proved in Lemma 5.9.2.1;
(ii) the payment-request cannot be modiﬁed as it is stated in Claim 3; (iii) the
issuer TP of the payment-request cannot deny its emission as it is stated in
Claim 2; and (iv) the calculus can be veriﬁed by the V, before it pays, in step
4ii and 4iii of Section 5.6, the amount of money required to pay is therefore
fair. 
Claim 7. Payments cannot be reused without detection.
Proof. Considering that a ζ1∗ contains a REF = hast((δ)) (see steps 6ii and
7iii of Section 5.6), and that δ is generated with random nonces from a V and
TP among others, the provability to ﬁnd a collision is negligible. Therefore,
when a payment-proof-1 ζ1∗ containing REF is generated and signed by PS,
and since the message cannot be modiﬁed, as it is stated in Claim 3, the
payment is unique. In the protocol, the detection is performed by TP in
steps 9ii and 9iii of Section 5.6. 
Lemma 5.9.2.2 The system complies with the authenticity, non-repudiation, in-
tegrity, fairly and uniqueness for payments in order that payments are valid.
Proof. When the issuer of a message is the PS and the message is a payment-
proof-1 ζ1∗, Claims 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 imply that the properties of authenticity,
non-repudiation, integrity, fairness and uniqueness hold for the payment-
proof-1 ζ1∗. In the protocol, authenticity, non-repudiation and integrity are
detected in step 9iii of Section 5.6.
Hence, the protocol satisﬁes the needed security requirements and the
payment is thus valid. 
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Lemma 5.9.2.3 The system complies with authenticity, non-repudiation, integrity,
temporality, stretch belonging, ownership, and valid payment for tickets in order
that tickets are valid.
Proof. When the issuer of a message is the TP, ticket θ∗ is considered the
message, the str is an identiﬁer used to link a stretch with prices, and the
f ingVq is an identiﬁer of a V used to link a V with a ticket, Claims 1, 2,
3, 4, 5 and Lemma 5.9.2.2 imply that the properties of authenticity, non-
repudiation, integrity, temporality, stretch belonging, ownership, and valid
payment hold for the ticket θ∗. In the protocol, authenticity, non-repudiation
and integrity are detected in steps 3ii-3vi of Section 5.7 by Chp.
Hence, the protocol satisﬁes the needed security requirements and the
ticket is thus valid. 
Claim 8. The toll system detects fraud when it is committed by a user.
Proof. Fraud is detected when a user enters a stretch without a ticket,
with an invalid ticket, with a valid ticket associated with another vehicle or
stretch, or with a valid ticket, which has previously been used to access the stretch
(reused). In the ﬁrst case, a driver attempting to enter a stretch with no ticket
will be detected in step 3vi of Section 5.7. The detection of a user with no
valid ticket is stated in Lemma 5.9.2.3. In the third case, a ticket associated
with another stretch is detected in step 3v of Section 5.7, and associated
with another user in step 3v of Section 5.7. Finally, in the last case, a valid
ticket, which has been previously used to access the stretch (reused), is detected in
Section 5.8.1. 
Claim 9. The system can identify dishonest users thanks to the anonymity
revocation offered by the system.
Proof. A dishonest user can be identiﬁed in two different ways according to
how fraud is detected (stated in Claim 8).
When fraud is detected due to a reused ticket in Section 5.8.1, SP sends
μv
∗ to PA to issue a trafﬁc ﬁne for the user. PA veriﬁes the incidence and asks
V for evidences. Note that these evidences are requested to V without being
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identiﬁed thanks to the use of a Bulletin Board. If the evidences do not refute
the accusation, then PA identiﬁes the user by opening the ﬁeld certVq.idS of
the certiﬁcate with its private key. Obtaining Vid allows the identiﬁcation
and the punishment of the dishonest user.
In other cases of fraud, the user is identiﬁed when she is photographed
by the Chp at the entrance of a stretch (it is described in step 3vi of Section
5.7. The user then loses her anonymity as the vehicle number plate is
captured. This information is sent to PA to act as it is speciﬁed in the
Sanction process. In the execution of this protocol, PA has the ability to
identify the user through the number plate. 
Theorem 5.9.2.4 The toll collection scheme keeps fraud under control and it can
identify dishonest users. These users receive the appropriate trafﬁc ﬁne. In contrast,
honest users are kept anonymous.
Proof. As it is stated in Claim 8 and 9, the system can detect fraud and
identify the fraudulent Vs. 
Claim 10. The protocol execution generates evidences for an honest user (they
are saved in the OBU) to prove the allegations of fraud.
Proof. A user, after entering a stretch, has obtained and generated several
messages (certVq , αstr
∗, βstr∗, γ∗, δ∗, ∗, ζ∗, η∗, θ∗, ι∗, λ∗, and ν∗) signed by
different entities involved in the protocol (SP, TP, Chp and herself), which
prove she has entered the stretch without committing fraud. Claims 1, 2, and
3 imply that the properties of authenticity, non-repudiation and integrity
hold for all these messages.
When a user is unjustly accused of fraud by SP, the user is notiﬁed by
PA during the Sanction process. She will then be able to retrieve some of
these records and provide them to PA in order to prove its own honesty (see
steps of Section 5.8.2-1ii and 5.8.2-2ii according to incidence type). 
Claim 11. The protocol execution generates evidences for an honest SP to prove
the allegations of fraud.
Proof. As in the case described in Claim 10, the system generates mes-
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sages/proofs, which can be used by the SP to refute an accusation when
it is unjustly accused of fraud by a V. All these proofs are generated and
signed by entities of the system, which prove the correct functioning of
the system. Claims 1, 2, and 3 imply that the properties of authenticity,
non-repudiation and integrity hold for all these messages. Therefore, these
message are accepted as proofs. 
Theorem 5.9.2.5 The system protects users and SP against false accusations.
Proof. As it is stated in Claim 10 and Claim 11, the protocol allows honest
users and SP to get evidences of their correct performance. The evidences
are used to rebut any trafﬁc ﬁne due to some kind of malfunction of the
system.
Entity Authenticity Requirements
In order to prevent impersonation, all the entities involved in the system,
which are not trusted, use authentication based on the access to a predis-
tributed authentic material (public keys and CA certiﬁcates).
In each communication, each entity convinces its communication part-
ner that, in the current communication, its identity is as declared. This is
achieved by signing a message with its credentials (secret key). This en-
tity then proves its identity by its signature on the message. If an adver-
sary intercepts the message signed by the entity, it could use it later to au-
thenticate herself as the entity. In order to prevent these attacks, which are
called replay attacks, random numbers or nonces are used as a challenge-
response scheme. The communication partner sends a nonce (challenge)
to the prover entity and the prover then returns a signed message contain-
ing this nonce (response). In this way, the message signed varies each time
(message uniqueness) and an attacker can reuse an old message.
In the communications where both entities are not trusted, the protocol
follows a 3-way mutual authentication scheme, similar to the X.509 three-
way authentication protocol.
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In addition, the use of signatures and public key certiﬁcates prevent from
Man in the Middle attacks.
In the particular case of the authentication of a V to another entity, the
generation of the asymmetric key pair and the public key certiﬁcate by
means of the CA installed in the SE, the signature of the messages sent
by it, and the storage of these credentials are performed in the SE of the V.
Therefore, the authentication of a V depends on how securely the initializa-
tion of the SE with a CA has been performed (as it is shown in Section 5.9.1)
and how much secure a SE is.
Privacy Requirements
Claim 12. The system does not allow to link an itinerary with a vehicle.
Proof. Considering that an itinerary is composed of messages or proofs,
which place a V in a set of ordered stretches such as tickets θ∗ or proof-of-
entrance ν, generated by execution of the system from a V enters a LEZ to
the V leaves it, the information that connects the messages composing an
itinerary is then the certiﬁcates certVq .
Thus, the information that can be used to identify a user certVq by an
internal (SP) or external attacker (by eavesdropping) is in its certiﬁcates.
Otherwise, the information of the itinerary does not represent a privacy
problem in itself, despite the location and temporal information that it con-
tains. Note that an internal attacker will have all that messages and it will
thus reconstruct the whole itinerary. In contrast, an external attacker will
have more difﬁculties with this reconstruction as it will eavesdrop all the
communications.
There are two ways of identifying a user by its certiﬁcate. On the one
hand, it is a certiﬁcate extension certVq .idS which contains the vehicle iden-
tiﬁer Vid. However, this information is protected with an asymmetric en-
cryption (in step 2 of Section 3.2.3), using the public key of PA. Therefore,
this information does not reveal the identity of the user as breaking the RSA
encryption is computationally unfeasible nowadays. On the other hand, the
certiﬁcate can be neither used to identify a user thanks to the fact that the
CA, installed in the SE, is shared with several users, since the user is regis-
tered in an element C of the subset K together with other users in Section
3.2.2. In this way, the issuer of certVq cannot be issued as identiﬁer. Note that
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in a contrary case, if the size of each element C of K (numC = |C| was one,
vehicles could be identiﬁed by their CA.
Assuming that the number of V registered in each element of K (Ci) has
an homogeneous distribution and that it is bigger than one (|Ci| = |Ci−1| >
1, ∀i ∈ [1, numK), where numK = |K|), then the probability (identify) to link
a V with an itinerary, and thus, identify a V, is Pr(indenti f y) = 1/m where
m = numK/numV = 1/numV/numK and numV = |V|, that is, the number
of Vs that have entered the LEZ sharing the same CA.
Hence, the system does not reveal the identity of a V because it cannot
be linked to any itinerary (anonymity). However, an attacker that is aware of
an itinerary will be able to identify a V in a certain probability depending
on the number of Vs sharing the same CA that have entered in LEZ. 
Claim 13. The system does not allow to link two itineraries.
Proof. Since an itinerary is composed of messages or proofs, which place
a V in a set of ordered stretches such as tickets θ∗ or proof-of-entrance ν, and
which are generated by execution of the system from the moment when a
V enters a LEZ until the moment when the V leaves it, two cases can be
considered:
• These two itineraries have associated their two certiﬁcates with differ-
ent CAs. Therefore, it is not possible to link both itineraries because a
V cannot change its CA. The probability to link two itineraries, which
have associated two certiﬁcates with different CAs is then zero.
• These two itineraries have associated their two certiﬁcates sharing the
same CA. Therefore, it is not possible to associate the two itineraries
for two reasons: (i) in the protocol described in step 3.2.3, which is
executed each time a V approaches a LEZ, the SE of each V generates
a new certVq in each new entrance to the LEZ. The certiﬁcates used in
each itinerary will then be different and they cannot be used to link
itineraries; (ii) When two itineraries (with a same CA) can be linked,
the ﬁrst itinerary can be linked to a V and the second itinerary can be
linked to the same V. Taking into account that it is not possible that
an itinerary cannot be linked with a V as it is stated in Claim 12, this
case is neither possible. However, an attacker will be able to link two
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itineraries sharing the same CA with a certain probability, which is
1/m2, where m is the number of Vs that have entered the LEZ sharing
the same CA.
Hence, the system avoids the linkability between itineraries because the
information generated in the system does not link two itineraries or more
itineraries. However, an attacker that is aware of several itineraries will be
able to link them in a certain probability depending on the number of Vs
that have entered the LEZ sharing the same CA. 
Claim 14. The system does not allow to link a payment with a V.
Proof. Considering that PS is a trusted entity, the way in which a V can be
linked with a payment done through the messages generated by the user and
PS. These message are payment-order , transfer-proof-1 ζ1 and transfer-proof-2
ζ2.
payment-order  = (ACK, NC, f ingPS, accs, amount, accd, REF) is generated
by the user in step 6 of Section 5.6 and signed using its payment credentials.
It contains information that can link a payer/user (account source accs) and
an V (REF). The reference REF is the hash(δ), which links with a δ = (REQ,
NA, str′, NB, ts, ticketid, f ingVq , amount, αstr). As it can observed, δ includes
f ingVq and a V could thus be identiﬁed. However, this is not possible thanks
to the use of a secure communication channel between V and PS. Therefore,
neither an internal attack nor an external attacker can obtain this information
and link an order payment with a V.
PS, after performing a set of veriﬁcations, such as the identity of the
payer as long as the payer has the necessary funds available, the payment
is run and transfer-proof-1 ζ1 = (amount, accd, REF) and transfer-proof-2 ζ2 =
(accs, amount, accd) are generates as a receipt in step 7 of Section 5.6. Booth
proofs are immediately returned to the user. As in the previous case, both
proofs contain information that can be used to link a V with a payment (REF
from ζ1 and accs from ζ2). However, the secure communication channel also
protects the disclosure of this information at this point.
V then sends ζ1∗ to TP in order to demonstrate the right payment and
to obtain a ticket (see step 8 of Section 5.6). After that, every certain period
of time and after PS sends ζ2∗ to SP jointly with other ζ2∗s from other users
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and transactions (see step 7vii of Section 5.6). Therefore, SP is in possession
of a set of ζ1∗ and a set of ζ2∗. In spite of this, SP is not able to link ζ1∗ and
ζ2
∗ since their content does not have information that links them, and the
time when SP receives both messages is different. However, the SP is able
to link two ζ1∗ and ζ2∗ from a set of proofs generated in a certain period of
time with a probability of 1/l∗2, where l is the number of pairs ζ1∗ and ζ2∗. 
Theorem 5.9.2.6 The presented system preserves the privacy of honest users and
protects their anonymity, thus avoiding the traceability of their actions. Otherwise,
the system reveals the identity of dishonest drivers.
Proof. On the one hand, the presented ERP system preserves privacy of
honest users in accordance with Claims 12, 13 and 14, being users able to
use the system anonymously since each new usage cannot be related to any
other with respect to the vehicle identity, and since the payment of a stretch
does not link the identity of a vehicle. On the other hand, the system revokes
the identity of the dishonest driver when fraud is detected as it is stated
in Claim 9. Note that in the case of a fraudulent driver, these drivers will
only lose their privacy in the itineraries where they have committed fraud
thanks to the fact that they change the certiﬁcate as it is stated in Claim 13. 
5.10 Functional Requirements Analysis
This section presents a feasibility study of the application of the proposed
system in the real world. This study is divided into two different parts, the
online-feasibility study and a trafﬁc simulation.
The ﬁrst one, the online-feasibility study, aims to evaluate the most critic
part of the system and to demonstrate that its execution is possible nowa-
days. This study involves Sections 3.2.3, 5.7 and 5.6.2, which have hard
temporary restrictions since communication between the entities is made in
movement. In particular, Vs, which keep moving in the LEZ, Beacons, Chps,
TP and PS have to be able to properly perform each step of these sections
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with sufﬁcient time to transmit and receive the expected set of proofs and
data (such as certiﬁcates, tickets or proof-of-entrance).
The second study, the trafﬁc simulation, attempts to evaluate whether this
system is able to effectively distribute the trafﬁc in the LEZ. This test has
been performed in a simulated environment, using a small topology as an
example.
5.10.1 On-line Feasibility Study
This study assesses the feasibility of the practical deployment of some parts
of the system. In particular, it is focused on the parts of the system that have
high temporary restrictions, where the information transmitted between the
entities is in movement. Thus, this study evaluate whether the execution of
that parts can be performed quickly enough to have time to transmit and
receive the required information in movement. In particular, these parts of
the protocol with high temporary restrictions are the Certiﬁcate Generation
phase (Section 3.2.3 of Certiﬁcation Protocol), the Ticket Acquisition phase (Sec-
tion 5.6.2 of Payment Protocol), and the whole Entrance Protocol (Section 5.7).
In the Certiﬁcate Generation, Vs have to generated new credentials in a rea-
sonable time previous to the entrance to the LEZ. In the Ticket Acquisition,
Vs have to obtain a ticket in movement. Beacons, Vs, TP and PS entities are
involved in this process. Similarly, in the Entrance Protocol, Vs enter a stretch
(Section 5.7) and deliver a ticket also in movement. V and Chps execute this
part of the system.
The following development environment and hardware have been used
in this study:
• Mobile Security Card SE 1.03: This is a Java Card in microSD format,
which provides security capabilities for smart phones. Speciﬁcally, it
uses version 5.0 of the Sm@artCafe´ Expert’s operating system. This
device has been used as the SE in the simulation because it is a cheap
tamper-proof device with cryptographic capabilities.
• Samsung Galaxy S3: This smart phone, which uses the Android 4.1.2
version, has been used as an OBU. This device has a CPU Quad-core
3http://www.gi-de.com/gd_media/media/press/prs_1/pdf/PM_MicroSD_Card_SE_10_
final_E.pdf
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
98
CHAPTER 5. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING
SYSTEM FOR LOW EMISSION ZONES WITH DYNAMIC PRICING
1.4 GHz Cortex-A9, 1 GB RAM and 4G communication. In addition,
it has a microSD card slot, which jointly with Android OS, they make
communication between smart phones and Mobile Security Card pos-
sible. The library Spongy Castle, which is a library for Android plat-
form containing the last version of the cryptographic library Bouncy
Castle, is used to perform the less sensitive cryptographic operations
out of the SE, such as signature and certiﬁcate veriﬁcations. This de-
vice plays the role of OBU in the simulation.
• PC: It is a common personal computer with a CPU of 2 i7-cores of 2,3
Ghz and 1 GB RAM. The used OS is a 64 bit Ubuntu 14.04. This device
will perform the operations of Chps in the simulation. These operations
have been developed using the Java language and the cryptographic
operations have been computed by using the last version of Bouncy
Castle, which is a Java library.
• Web Service: Google App Engine, which is a platform as a service cloud
computing platform for developing web applications in Java, has been
used to carry out the operations to be performed by PS and TP. The
cryptographic operations have also been computed by means of the
Bouncy Castle.
The study consists in obtaining the performance cost of the system exe-
cution and in evaluating whether this cost is low enough to make commu-
nication in movement possible using an affordable hardware and easier to
ﬁnd in the market.
Concerning the communication used, two different communication types
are considered. On the one hand, a 4G communication technology has been
used in the communication between Vs, TP and PS entities. On the other
hand, the cost of the communication between Beacons, Vs and Chps has been
estimated from [41], which uses an implementation of ZigBee named XBee4
and which takes into account the Doppler effect on the communication in
movement. The results obtained in [41] prove that the communication in
movement between a vehicle at 60km/h and a ﬁxed point with a low num-
ber of erroneous packets is possible. In detail, 2000 packets can be correctly
4http://www.digi.com/lp/xbee/
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received, and even more if the velocity of the vehicle is lower. These 2000
packets can be transmitted from 250m of distance, which means that ap-
proximately 133 packets per second can be transmitted along it, and that
each packet can be ﬁtted with 100 bytes of data.
In view of the aforementioned situation, the total temporal cost has been
calculated by implementing the steps of the protocols and by estimating
the communication cost, in some cases, and in others, by using 4G. The 4G
communication and the computational costs were gathered by averaging the
single processes over 100 iterations. The details of the implementation and
the performance results obtained in each phase are detailed below:
1. Certiﬁcate Generation phase (Section 3.2.3): The generation of an entity
certiﬁcate every time a V is on its way to enter a LEZ is implemented.
It consists in ﬁrst generating a RSA key pair (PkVq ,SkVq) of 2048 bits in
the Mobile Security Card, and then the public key certiﬁcate certVq , fol-
lowing the features described in step 2 (such as the extension contain-
ing the encrypted Vid with the public key of PA). All these have been
achieved thanks to the installation of VCACi certiﬁcation entity in the
Mobile Security Card. The temporal cost of certiﬁcate generation in the
Mobile Security Card, which follows the features described in the pro-
tocol, is 10,350s, and the size of the generated certiﬁcate stored in the
smart phone memory is 1574 bytes. Note that the temporal cost covers
the key pair generation, the certiﬁcate generation and the extraction of
it outside the SE.
2. Ticket Acquisition phase (Section phase 5.6.2): The cost related to the
interaction between Vs and Beacons, TP and PS to pay and obtain a
ticket to the LEZ is simulated here. The temporal cost of this phase,
which is separated according to the computation and communication
costs, is detailed below for each step. In addition, the size of the trans-
mitted information in the communication by means of XBee (Step 1) is
detailed in order to be estimated.
• Step 1: Total = 0,032s.
– Computational cost: 0s.
– Communication cost: 0,032s (472 bytes = 5 data packets).
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• Step 2: Total = 0,9090.
– Computational cost: 0,8550s.
– Communication cost: 0,0540s.
• Step 3: Total = 0,3720s.
– Computational cost: 0,0250s.
– Communication cost: 0,347s.
• Step 4: Total = 0,0620s.
– Computational cost: 0,0060s.
– Communication cost: 0,0560s.
• Step 5: Total = 0,2650s.
– Computational cost: 0,0050s.
– Communication cost: 0,2600s.
• Step 6: Total = 0,0830s.
– Computational cost: 0,0180s.
– Communication cost: 0,0650s.
• Step 7: Total = 0,2850s.
– Computational cost: 0,0150s.
– Communication cost: 0,2700s.
• Step 8: Total = 1,1551s.
– Computational cost: 1,0571s.
– Communication cost: 0,0980s.
• Step 9: Total = 0,2620s.
– Computational cost: 0,0170s.
– Communication cost: 0,245s.
• Step 9: Total = 0,0020s.
– Computational cost: 0s.
– Communication cost:0,0020s.
Thus, the total temporal cost is 3,4273s.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ENHANCING DRIVERS’ PRIVACY IN URBAN ELECTRONIC ROAD PRICING SYSTEMS. 
Roger Jardí Cedó 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1572-2015
5.10. FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 101
3. Entrance Protocol (Section 5.7): The cost related to the interaction be-
tween Vs and Chps to get access to the LEZ by sending a ticket is
simulated here. The temporal cost of this phase, which is separated
according to the computation and communication costs, is detailed be-
low for each step. In addition, the size of the transmitted information
in the communication by means of XBee is also detailed in order to be
estimated.
• Step 1: Total = 0,118s.
– Computational cost: 0,008s.
– Communication cost: 0,110s ( 1644 bytes = 17 data packets).
• Step 2: Total = 1,533s.
– Computational cost: 1,338s.
– Communication cost: 0,195s (2940 bytes = 30 data packets).
• Step 3: According to the results of the veriﬁcations performed in
this step, some of the following sub-steps will be either performed
or not. If the veriﬁcations are correctly performed (Steps 3i - 3vi,
and 3viii), Total = s. Otherwise (Steps 3i - 3vi, and 3vii), Total = s.
The detail of the sub-steps is as follows:
– Steps 3i - 3vi: 0,012s.
∗ Computational cost: 0,012s.
∗ Communication cost: None.
– Step 3vii: Total = 0,186s. Note that the time required to obtain
the license plate of the V from the camera is taken from [42].
∗ Computational cost: 0,011s.
∗ License recognition cost: 0,175s.
∗ Communication cost: None
– Step 3viii: Total = 0,023s.
∗ Computational cost: 0,004s.
∗ Communication cost: 0,019s (267 bytes = 3 data packets).
• Step 4: Total = 0,001s. Note that this step will be performed if the
veriﬁcations performed in Steps 3ii - 3vi are correct.
– Computational cost: 0,001s.
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– Communication cost: None.
Supposing that the execution of the protocol is performed correctly,
when an incidence has not been generated, that is, the veriﬁcations
performed in Steps 3ii - 3vi are correct, the total temporal cost is 1,688s.
On the contrary, if an incidence has been generated, that is, one of the
veriﬁcations performed in Steps 3ii - 3vi fails, then the temporal cost is
1,849s.
Therefore, both results are fast enough in order for them to have time
to communicate in movement. The temporal length of communication
window, in which both entities are able to transmit information at 60
km/h along 250m of distance, is 15s. There is therefore a high margin
between 1,849s and 15s, and even more if the velocity of the vehicle is
lower.
After these tests, the online feasibility of the system has been stated. In
particular, the capability of generating a certiﬁcate in a SE accomplishing
with the protocol within a reasonable period of time, has been proved. Both
parts of the protocol with higher temporal restrictions, in which a V obtains
a ticket and enters a stretch, Ticket Acquisition phase and Entrance protocol,
have been also demonstrated to be feasible in movement with a reasonable
speed. In particular, they take 3,427s and 1,688s, which is a total of 5,115s.
This time is equivalent to driving 85,255 m. at 60 km/h. Thus, the length
of the payment area should be longer than this value. The signatures per-
formed in the SE take almost one second and they become the slowest oper-
ations. Further, these results could be easily improved with a more powerful
hardware such as a brand new Java Card.
Optionally, the generation cost of a public key certiﬁcate certVq (10,350s)
enables vehicles to change the credentials more frequently than the system
considers in order to improve their privacy, provided that the distance be-
tween stretches was sufﬁcient to generate the credentials and execute the
Ticket Acquisition phase and the Entrance Protocol.
5.10.2 Trafﬁc Simulation
The system presented in this work aims at distributing the trafﬁc in the
LEZ, and reducing then pollution emissions, by modifying the prices of
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each stretch dynamically according to its density. In this section, a trafﬁc
simulation, which evaluates the effect of applying the proposed ERP system
on a trafﬁc network, is presented. This experiment, which is very costly
in real environments, is performed with a trafﬁc simulator. The simulation
environment and results are detailed in the following subsections.
Simulation Environment:
The simulation environment is characterized by the simulator, the topology
(or road map), the trafﬁc demand (routes) and the time duration:
• Simulator: The simulator used to perform these tests is the Simulation
of Urban MObility (SUMO)5. It is a widely used open trafﬁc simulator
[48, 49], which is able to model the trafﬁc in the most realistic way.
SUMO was developed by the German Aerospace Center (DLR) in 2001,
and since then, it has evolved into a set of utilities such as a trafﬁc
demand generator and a Dijkstra route planner.
• Topology: The trafﬁc network considered is like the one in Figure 5.3.
This network is one of the trafﬁc map samples provided by SUMO.
In particular, it has the shape of a spider-net with four arms or axes
within the net and three circles making up a 24-edge net. The distance
between circles is of 100 meters. Each junction of the net has a stop
signal.
• Trafﬁc ﬂow: The number of trips are one per second throughout the
simulation. However, origins and destinations are randomly gener-
ated among all nodes in the network. All the vehicle have the same
characteristics, that is, same fuel consumption, same pollution, etc.
• Duration: The simulation starts in the second zero and ends after 7200
seconds (2 hours).
Simulation Results:
With the aim of proving that the application of the ERP system has a positive
effect on the trafﬁc, two different tests have been performed with the same
5www.dlr.de/ts/sumo/en/
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Figure 5.3: Topology
simulator and environment. The ﬁrst one shows the trafﬁc performance
when the users choose the cheapest path taking into account just the dis-
tance. In contrast, the second simulation evaluates the trafﬁc performance
when the users select the path according not only to the distance, but also to
the toll price, which constantly changes according to the vehicle occupancy
of the road, that is, in the same way as the proposed ERP system.
The evaluation and comparison have been carried out according to a set
of metrics. These metrics are:
• Travel Time: It is the arithmetic mean of the time needed to reach their
destination from their place of origin for all the vehicles in the simula-
tion period.
• Waiting Time: It is the arithmetic mean of the time the vehicles are
stopped in the network for all the vehicles in the simulation period.
• Distance: It is the arithmetic mean of the total distance traveled by all
the vehicles to go from their place of origin to their place of destination.
• Fuel: It is the arithmetic mean of the fuel consumed by vehicles when
traveling through their path.
• Number of Vehicles: It is the number of vehicles that entered the network
in the simulation period. Note that all vehicles (7200) cannot enter the
network due to the network collapse.
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Figure 5.4: Collapse
Both simulations are described and evaluated in detail below.
1. No ERP system test: In this case, the trafﬁc has been simulated with
static vehicle routes from the mentioned demand. These routes have
been computed using the Dijkstra routing algorithm to ﬁnd the opti-
mal path, taking into account the fuel consumption as edge weight,
that is, ﬁnding the path with less effort. This effort is the estimated
fuel consumption required to travel along the edge, which considers
a set of variables such as the edge distance, the maximum speed of
the edge, the acceleration of the vehicle or the fuel consumption of the
vehicle. The routes have been computed once before starting the simu-
lation. In this way, the vehicles follow their precalculated path during
the simulation without changing it.
The results obtained in the simulation are shown in the second line
of Table 5.10.2. As it can be observed, only 574 vehicles entered the
network due to trafﬁc jams. The high travel time, 3307,54 seconds,
gives an idea of the network collapse, which is too large travel time to
cover a few hundred meters. This collapse can be seen in Figure 5.4.
2. ERP system application test: Unlike the previous case, the route of each
vehicle is dynamically recomputed every second. Although the rout-
ing algorithm used here is the same, Dijkstra, the edge weight is not
exactly the same. Moreover, these costs change according to the use
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of the road, that is, the road capacity, which constantly changes. The
formula used to calculate the edge weight is described below:
e f f ortedge × 0, 01+ capacityedge × f actor = weightedge
The e f f ortedge is the estimated consumption of fuel required to travel
along the edge like in the previous case. These units of the effort are
ml. For this reason, it is multiplied by 0, 01, which is an estimated
price per ml of fuel (1e/l of fuel). Thus, the ﬁrst addend is the theo-
retical cost or effort in Euros if there is no trafﬁc. The second addend
is the toll charge, which depends on the number of vehicles that are
traveling along the edge multiplied by a factor. The capacity is con-
tinuously updated by the system, and it increases when a vehicle en-
ters the edge. The effect of road capacity on travel times is usually
speciﬁed by means of the so called volume-delay or link travel time
functions t(v/q), which express the travel time on a link as a function
depending on the link trafﬁc volume v and the link capacity q. One
of the most common link travel time formulas is the Bureau of Public
Roads (BPR) [50] cost function. Although this function could improve
the assessment of the value of the toll addend, for the sake of sim-
plicity, and due to the fact that it is out of the scope of this work, the
simulations have been performed with several factor values using the
equation above. In particular, the simulation has been carried out with
factor values ranging from 0,01 to 2,00 with an increment of 0,001. The
max factor supposes a toll addend 127 times higher than the max value
of the ﬁrst addend when the capacity is 20% (31, 413× 0, 01 = 0, 3141,
where 31, 413 is the max effort of an edge).
In order to simplify the results and eliminate the individual effect of
the factor values, the arithmetic mean of each metric considering all
factor values is showed.
The results obtained in the simulation are shown in the second line
of Table 5.10.2. As it can be seen, the results are better than the ones
obtained in the “No ERP” case, except for the distance traveled. This
is due to the fact that the route of the vehicles tries to avoid roads with
high occupancy and then, the vehicles follow longer routes but, still,
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Test Travel Time (s) Waiting Time (s) Distance (m) Fuel (ml) # of Vehicles
1) No-ERP 3307,54 2849,97 401,15 640,43 574
2) ERP 1869,56 1515,31 637,38 374,99 1687,86
Table 5.3: Results Comparison
get lower fuel consumption. Moreover, the quantity of vehicles that
enter the network is larger as there are less trafﬁc jams (the waiting
time is small). As a side note, the simulations have shown that a factor
equal to 0,494 is the best in terms of travel time for this particular
context. This factor reaches mean travel and waiting times of 263,95
and 2,35 seconds, respectively, and mean traveled distance equals to
758,26.
Comparison
In this subsection, after having carried out the simulations, both cases, metric
by metric, are compared.
As it can be observed in Table 5.10.2, the results are better in the second
case, where dynamic prices are applied for all the metrics except for the
distance. Thanks to the change in the edge prices and the frequent route
re-planning, the congestion and the travel time are improved. The fuel con-
sumption is also reduced as trafﬁc jams are minimized. The same reasoning
can be applied to the number of vehicles, which suggest that with less con-
gestion, more vehicles can enter the net. Finally, It is stated that the distance
becomes higher in the second test as the routes of the vehicles avoid con-
gested roads and prefer taking longer routes.
As a conclusion of these simulations, it can be stated that the results
applying the ERP system on the road network are positive. The comparison
has shown that this ERP system can reduce the consumed fuel, and thus the
air pollution from vehicles, by reducing the travel time and trafﬁc jams. If the
comparison is made between the best result obtained with the factor 0,494,
the results are even more encouraging. However, in order to determine
the the extent to which the use of this system in more realistic networks is
proﬁtable, a deeper study needs to be done. This task will be addressed in
the future.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
This chapter summarizes the contributions of this thesis in §6.1, the related publica-
tions in §6.2, and the possible future research lines in §6.3.
Contents
6.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.2 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.3 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
6.1 Contributions
The high levels of pollution and trafﬁc congestion that are present in al-
most all major cities around the world have brought solutions such as the
deployment of Electronic Road Pricing (ERP) systems in some of these cities.
The main goal of these systems is to restrict trafﬁc in the Low Emission Zone
(LEZ), for which a toll is assessed according to the trafﬁc and pollution con-
ditions.
These systems have to provide fraud control while drivers’ privacy is
guaranteed, because poor fraud control does not facilitate the proper op-
eration of the system, and a lack of privacy would result in users being
excessively monitored.
The systems proposed in the literature have been analyzed in terms of
fraud control and privacy. From this study, it is concluded that they of-
fer probabilistic fraud control that depends on the number of photographs
taken of vehicles by checkpoints. Drivers’ privacy is then affected since the
system records information about their itinerary with more or less accuracy.
For this reason, two new Electronic Road Pricing Systems have been pro-
posed in order to detect fraud in a deterministic way while preserving pri-
vacy of honest drivers by means of revocable anonymity.
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As it has been stated in this work, group signatures and pseudonym
mechanisms do not accomplish with the authentication requirements, which
have to be met in a LEZ, such as the computational cost and the privacy
offered.A new authentication scheme based on the RSA signature is thus pro-
posed, which allows users to dynamically generate credentials (public key
pairs and certiﬁcates) and to sign messages on behalf of the group in a low-
cost tamperproof device or secure element with efﬁcient RSA functionalities.
These credentials include a ciphered identiﬁer of the owners of vehicles,
which can be used to revoke drivers’ anonymity by opening it. In this the-
sis, it has been proved that the dynamic generation of public key certiﬁcates
in the secure element using a certiﬁcation authority, which is installed in it,
is feasible, and it has a cost of 10,350s with a key length of 2048 bits. The
generation of a public key certiﬁcate is performed in a non-critical phase
of the protocol. Otherwise, signatures are required in critical phases of the
protocol, and so their cost is crucial. The cost of a signature in this de-
vice is reasonable since it takes less than one second, which is faster than
group signatures [30, 31, 32]. Thus, the resulting scheme provides an anony-
mous authentication mechanism with revocable anonymity, which has suit-
able temporal costs for enabling the communication between vehicles and
checkpoints in movement. Both proposals use this mechanism in order to
preserve users’ privacy as long as users collaborate.
The ﬁrst proposal is based on a time approach where drivers pay accord-
ing to the time spent in the LEZ. In this system, the LEZ, as in many real
cases, can be composed of a single zone or multiple zones. In the ﬁrst case,
drivers are suggested to use the LEZ as less time as possible, or they are just
dissuaded from their entrance. In the second case, drivers can be suggested
to cover less expensive areas. In both cases, the entrance/departure process
of the LEZ is controlled so that the legitimate tax is computed while user’s
anonymity is preserved. Therefore, when a user commits fraud, and only in
this case, she is identiﬁed according to the way she committed fraud. Two
identiﬁcation methods are provided. In one case, checkpoints identify a ve-
hicle by taking a photograph of the vehicle’s license plate. In the other case,
Punishment Authority revokes drivers’ anonymity by opening the ciphered
identiﬁer of their credentials. A security and privacy study has been carried
out, which shows that the system offers the required properties. Apart from
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this, a study of the practical application of the most critic part of the system
has been performed using common hardware such as smart phones and
smart cards. Considering the communication and the computational costs,
the entrance and the departure processes have a cost of 2,400s and 1,883s,
respectively, in the worst case scenario. These results are fast enough to be
feasible in movement. This study has also included the evaluation of the
feasibility to adapt existing electronic payment systems in order to accom-
plish with drivers’ anonymity and untraceability. In both cases, it has been
demonstrated that this proposal is realistic and may be deployed in practical
scenarios.
The second proposal follows a dynamic pricing approach independently
for each road stretch, where drivers pay according to the paths covered. Un-
like the ﬁrst proposal, the LEZs are deﬁned as a set of stretches. In this case,
drivers are suggested to re-plan their route in order to cover less expensive
stretches. For this reason, the entrance of each stretch is controlled so that
the legitimate tax is dynamically computed depending on the trafﬁc volume
while user’s anonymity is preserved. As in the ﬁrst proposal, drivers that
collaborate with the system keep their privacy. Otherwise, dishonest drivers
are identiﬁed through revocable anonymity or registration by Checkpoints.
These properties are also analyzed in a study showing that the system offers
them. The phases of the protocol where a vehicle enters a stretch and com-
municates with other entities in movement have been implemented using
non custom-made devices.The results obtained from this study show that
the costs of obtaining a ticket and then entering a stretch by exchanging
it are fast enough, as they take 5,115s. In addition, it has been evaluated
whether this system is able to manage trafﬁc by means of a simulation in
a small topology. The results are promising and show that the system can
reduce the air pollution from vehicles in the simulated environment. How-
ever, it requires a deep study in more realistic and complex environments in
order to prove it in real environments.
Hence, the last proposal requires a higher infrastructure expense but of-
fers a greater level of impact on trafﬁc by dispersing it from high occupancy
stretches. Otherwise, the ﬁrst proposal implies less infrastructure costs while
the effect on the trafﬁc is also lower.
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6.2 Publications
The publications supporting the content of this dissertation are stated below:
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Macia` Mut Puigserver, Magdalena Payeras-Capella`,
Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Electronic Road Pricing System
for Low Emission Zones to Preserve Driver Privacy” In 11th Interna-
tional Conference Modeling Decisions for Artiﬁcial Intelligence (MDAI 2014)
pp. 1–13. 2014.
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Privacy-
Preserving Electronic Toll System with Dynamic Pricing for Low Emis-
sion Zones” In 9th International Workshop on Data Privacy Management
(DPM 2014) pp. 327–334. 2014.
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Macia` Mut Puigserver, Magdalena Payeras-Capella`,
Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Time-based Electronic Road Pric-
ing System for Low Emission Zones Preserving Drivers’ Privacy” In
International Journal of Computer Communications 2015. Under review.
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Privacy-
Preserving Electronic Road Pricing System for Low Emission Zones
with Dynamic Pricing” In International Journal of Security and Commu-
nication Networks 2015. Under review.
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Macia` Mut Puigserver, Magdalena Payeras-Capella`,
Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Sistema de Telepeaje en Zonas
Urbanas” In XIII Reunio´n Espanola de Criptografı´a y Seguridad de la Infor-
macio´n (RECSI’14). (XIII Spanish Meeting on Cryptography and Informa-
tion Security). pp. 93–99. 2014.
• Roger Jardı´-Cedo´, Jordi Castella`-Roca, Alexandre Viejo “Urban Elec-
tronic Road Pricing Systems Preserving Drivers’ Privacy” In URV Doc-
toral Workshop in Computer Science and Mathematics (DCSM-2014). pp.
23–26. 2014.
6.3 Future work
The work presented in this thesis opens several future research lines:
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• In the anonymous authentication scheme proposed, the way in which
vehicles are distributed in groups of vehicles that share the same cer-
tiﬁcation authority may affect drivers’ privacy. For this reason, a deep
study assessing this issue is required. In particular, a test with the traf-
ﬁc simulator used in this work evaluating several compositions of the
groups, such as the size of the group or the origin of vehicles, can be
useful. In addition, the size of each group has to be studied from the
certiﬁcate maintenance point of view.
• In both proposals, communication between vehicles and checkpoints
has been estimated from another work, which has been put into prac-
tice. However, a further study in a more real scenario is required taking
into account the interference signals produced by other devices, or just
by the coexistence of vehicles entering a checkpoint at the same time.
• In the Functional Requirements Analysis of the second proposal, it
is stated that a more detailed study of the impact of applying this
ERP system on trafﬁc is required in order to determine the extent to
which the use of this system in more realistic networks is proﬁtable.
In addition, prices of stretches should be ﬁxed taking into account the
Bureau of Public Roads cost function in order to obtain the best results.
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